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SOME PHASES OF OMNIBUS
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE
By

NORMAN

E.

RISJORD*

Insurance officials often feel that the underwriting of specific
individuals is at least theoretically feasible and that the underwriting of their associates, employees, and friends is not, and therefore that automobile liability insurance should cover only the person to whom the policy is issued. The underwriting facts of life are
that the automobile liability policy covers not only the named insured, i.e., the policyholder, but also certain other persons not
named in the policy but insured by it, if they bear a specified relationship to the automobile in question.
I.

STANDARD

PROVISIONS

The 1963 revision standard family automobile liability policy
insures:
(a) with respect to an automobile owned by the named
insured and covered by the policy:
(1) the named insured and any resident of the
same household,
(2) any person using the automobile with the permission of the named insured, provided his
actual operation or (if he is not operating)
his other actual use thereof is within the scope
of such permission, and,
(3) any other person or organization but only with
respect to his or its liability because of acts or
omissions of a person insured under (a) (1)
or (2) above;
(b) with respect to a non-owned automobile (as defined):
(1) the named insured,
(2) any relative, but only with respect to a private
passenger automobile or trailer, provided his
actual operation or (if he is not operating)
the other actual use thereof is with the permission, or reasonably believed to be with the
permission, of the owner and is within the
scope of such permission, and,
(3) any other person or organization not owning
or hiring the automobile, but only with respect
to his or its liability because of acts or omissions of an insured under (b) (1) or (2)
above.
* Vice President and General Counsel, Employers Reinsurance Corporation, Kansas City, Missouri;
member Wisconsin and Missouri Bars; member of Quarterly Committee and former Vice President,
Federation of Insurance Counsel; member of Automobile and Publications Committees of the Section
of Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law, American Bar Association; and co-author Risjord
and Austin, Automobile Liability Insurance Cases (each footnote to a citation here will also give
the case number of the write-up of that case in that work as "R. & A. Case -").
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OWNED AUTOMOBILE

A. Spouse
The spouse of the named insured is treated by the policy for
most purposes as the named insured, if a resident of the same
household.
Section 163, (3) of the New York Insurance Law provides that
the policy shall not be deemed to insure against the liability of any
insured because of injury to or death of the spouse unless the policy
expressly provides such coverage. In a declaratory judgment action
to determine coverage for an injury to a woman passenger in the
named insured's automobile, the insurer argued that the named insured and the woman passenger had been living in an "open and
notorious relationship" which qualified her as a "spouse" and thus,
because of the statute, disqualified coverage for injury to her under
the policy. The court held that the relationship between the two
was one of "meretricious companionship" to which the statute did
not apply and suggested that, since the policy provided that the
spouse and her "resident relatives" were "insured," it was doubtful
that the insurer "stands ready to afford its coverage to claims
against one like this female defendant and her household relatives."
If so, it breeds a hornet's nest for itself.1 Perhaps the court had
more foresight than the insurance company!
B. Passenger
A passenger is clearly using the automobile by virtue of his
presence and, if his use causes an injury, he is insured by the policy.
When the operator of an automobile stopped it to visit with a
woman, who stood outside the automobile with her hands on it,
and a passenger slammed the previously ajar back door on the
hands of the woman, a Louisiana court of appeal held that the passenger was "using" the automobile, and was thus insured under
the omnibus clause of the policy covering the automobile. 2
A recent case involved the question of "use" by a passenger of
an automobile owned by his employer, the custody of which was
assigned to the employee. While the employer's automobile was
driven by a woman with the employee riding as a passenger, the
employer's automobile struck another car from the rear and
knocked it into the lane of oncoming traffic where it was struck
broadside by an oncoming truck. Four persons in the other car were
injured, three of them fatally. In an action to recover for the injury and deaths brought against the employer's insurer there was
evidence that the employee-passenger sat next to the driver in the
car and "pestered her"; that he grabbed the steering wheel just before the accident and thus prevented the driver from turning to the
right so as to miss the vehicle ahead; and that the employee-passenger knocked the driver's foot off the brake so that she could
not stop before striking the car ahead. A United States District
Court for the Western District of Louisiana entered a judgment
against the insurer, holding (inter alia) that, since the jury had
1 United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Cruz, 230 N.Y.S.2d 779 (S. Ct. 1962), R. & A. Case 2567.
2 Bolton v. North River Ins. Co., 102 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 1958), R. & A. Case 1614.
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found that the employee-passenger was "using" the automobile at
the time of the accident, he was an additional insured under the
policy. 3 The result seems appropriate, since a passenger is certainly
"using" the automobile and here the accident apparently resulted
from the passenger's "use."
Another passenger case involved a taxicab. A woman brought
action against her husband and (under a city ordinance) the insurer of a taxicab, alleging the insurance and that, while she was
alighting from the taxicab, after she had ridden in it with her husband, her husband negligently closed the door on her hand causing
injuries. The insurer appealed from an order overruling its demurrer to the complaint. The Supreme Court of South Carolina
affirmed, holding that, under the facts alleged, the husband was
"using" the automobile and the accident arose out of the negligent
"unloading" thereof. 4 This was a three to two decision. While there
was some confusion in the two opinions as to whether "permission"
was sufficiently alleged, and while, of course, permission should
have been alleged, there would seem to be little doubt that the
closing of the door of the taxicab by the husband was an act
within the implied permission of the named insured. If permission
was appropriately alleged, there is no question that the majority
opinion was correct since it appears that the husband was "using"
the automobile and therefore was an omnibus insured under the
policy covering the taxicab.
3 Thibodeaux v. Brown Oil Tools, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 495 (W.D. La. 1961), R. & A. Case 1614.
4 Coletrain v. Coletrain, 238 S.C. 555, 121 S.E.2d 89 (1961), R. & A. Case 2313.
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C. Stranger
Since the omnibus clause of the basic automobile liability
policy extends coverage generally to any person using, and any
person or organization legally responsible for the use of the owned
automobile, some of the most interesting cases involve the use,
usually loading or unloading, of the automobile by a stranger to
it, that is, one neither the owner nor the operator nor a member
of its crew. The coverage questions are manifold. The stranger is
usually an employee of a consignor or consignee of goods shipped
in the truck who is often insured under a general liability or a
non-ownership automobile policy. If the accident involved the
use, loading, or unloading of an automobile, the non-ownership
policy will cover its named insured but not his employee, and the
general liability policy will cover its named insured if the accident occurs on premises owned, rented, or controlled by him, but
will not cover his employee.
If the consignor or consignee, as the case may be, is held liable
under respondeat superior for an injury caused by his employee
in using, loading, or unloading the automobile, he will have a
right-over against the negligent employee who, in turn, is insured
only under the automobile liability policy. If the injured happens
to be the truck driver or other employee of the owner of the
automobile, the automobile insurer may contend that there is
no coverage under the automobile liability policy because the
injured is an employee of the named insured so that the Employee
Exclusion applies. The Employee Exclusion excludes coverage
for injury to an employee of the insured and the automobile insurer may contend that the term the insured always includes the
named insured so as to preclude coverage for any insured with
respect to injuries to an employee of the named insured.
A recent federal decision in Idaho illustrates this problem.
One insurer issued its comprehensive automobile liability policy
(including non-ownership coverage) to a contractor. Another insurer issued its automobile liability policy to the owner of a
transitmix concrete truck. The concrete truck was dispatched to
deliver and unload concrete at a construction site of the contractor. An employee of the contractor was helping the truck driver
unload the concrete truck when the truck driver was injured. The
truck driver brought action in an Idaho court against the contractor and his employee. In a declaratory judgment action between
the insurers, the United States District Court for the District of
Idaho, Eastern Division, declared that the automobile insurer of
the truck, and not the non-ownership insurer of the contractor,
was obliged to defend the damage action and pay any judgment
which might result, holding (1) that, if the contractor was liable
for the alleged negligent act of his employee, he could recoup his
losses from the negligent employee, (2) that, if the employer
might recoup his losses, then his insurer may subrogate and collect from the negligent employee or the _employee's insurer, (3)
that the insurer ultimately liable should be obligated to defend in
the first instance, (4) that the non-ownership policy covered the
named insured-contractor but not his employee, (5) that, since
the employee was "using" the truck, the truck policy covered
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the employee and, since the contractor was a person "legally
responsible" for the use of the truck by his employee, the truck
policy also covered the contractor, and (6) that, since any loss
must ultimately fall on the truck insurer as the sole insurer of
the contractor's employee, there was no "other insurance" available and the truck insurer was obligated to defend both the contractor and his employee.5
While the court mentioned that the contractor's coverage under
his non-ownership policy was "excess" over his coverage under
the truck policy, the same result should have been reached had
the contractor's policy been a general liability policy which would
not have been "excess." This for the reason that the ultimate liability was that of the contractor's employee, the negligent actor, and
he was insured by the truck policy only. That was the case with
the same result in the leading companion New York cases on the
subject, Wagman and Bond Stores6 which have been much cussed
and discussed 7 over the years.
It is to be noted that, in the Idaho federal case, while the injured truck driver was an employee of the named insured in
the truck policy, the district court did not mention the Employee
Exclusion. Possibly the question was not raised. Since the automobile policy excludes injury to an employee of "the insured,"
the question, if raised, would have been Who Is "The Insured"?
Or, granted that any particular insured is denied coverage for
injury to his employee, is coverage denied to any particular insured where the injury is to an employee (not of that insured but)
of some other insured? In the early days of the standard automobile policy, 1936 to 1940, that question bothered the insurance
industry. The question was precisely raised for the first time at
a meeting in Chicago in 1940 of the Joint Forms Committee which
had prepared and promulgated the standard provisions, for compulsory use by the member companies of (what are now respectively known as) the National Bureau of Casualty and Surety
Companies and the American Mutual Insurance Alliance, and
which were voluntarily used by most of the independent companies. After some discussion, one of the two members of the
original drafting sub-committee stated authoritatively that the
word "insured," as used in the Employee Exclusion and elsewhere in the exclusion, conditions and other limiting provisions
of the policy, meant (and meant only) the particular person
claiming coverage, or the particular person coverage for whom
was at issue, so that, so far as the Employee Exclusion was concerned, it applied to deny coverage for any insured only with
respect to injury to his employees.
This interpretation was repeated for the members of the
National Bureau by successive general counsels of the Bureau,
5 Travelers Ins. Co. v. General Cas. Co. of America, 187 F. Supp. 234 (D. Idaho 1960), R. & A.
Case 2096.
6 Wagman v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 304 N.Y. 490, 109 N.E.2d 592 (1952), affirming 279 App.
Div. 933, 112 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1952), affirming Mem. 201 Misc. 325, 108 N.Y.S.2d 854 (S. Ct. 1951), R. & A.
Case 149; and Bond Stores, Inc. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 133 N.Y.S.2d 297 (S. Ct. 1954), R. & A.
Case 1204.
7 See, e.g., Risiord, Loading and Unloading, 13 Vand. L. Rev. 903, 932-933 (1960); Brown and
Risiord. Loading and Unloading., The Conflict Between Fortuitous Adversaries, 29 Ins. Counsel 1. 197,
203-205, 211-212 (1962).
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the late Elmer W. Sawyer (who, by the way, was the other of
the two members of the original drafting sub-committee) and
James B. Donovan, by bulletins respectively dated February 26,
1941 and June 10, 1954, and was reemphasized by officials of two
Bureau Companies, Dykess in 1958, and Gow~an 9 in 1963, and by
other writers, some learned ° and some not.1'
The interpretation which was always intended was expressed
and made a part of the standard provisions program in the 1955
editions of the various standard provisions under the title "Severability of Interests"'2 and was improved and clarified in the
1956 family automobile and later standard provisions."'
There are at least fourteen variations of the issue where
one insured claims coverage for liability for injury to an employee
of another insured, the most common being the situation where
an omnibus insured (often a stranger to the truck crew) claims
coverage under the automobile policy for injury to an employee
(often the truck driver) of the named insured (usually the truck4
owner). On that one issue, there appear to be nine jurisdictions'
properly confining the Employee Exclusion to situations where
the injured is an employee of the particular insured claiming
coverage: Arkansas, 1" California, 16 Louisiana,' 7 Minnesota, 8 New
8 Dykes, The Underwriting Intent, 25 Ins. Counsel J. 27 (1958).
9 Gowan, Provisions of Automobile and Liability Insurance Contracts, 30 Ins. Counsel J. 96, 100
(1963).
10 Thomas, Other Provisions - Declarations and Conditions, 1955 Proceedings, Section of Insurance Law, American Bar Association 56, 65.
11 Risjord and Austin, Who Is "The Insured"? Fed. of Ins. C. Quarterly 52, 24 U. Kan. City L.
Rev. 65 (1955-56); Risjord, Underwriting Intent, 7 Fed. of Ins. C. Quarterly 41; Risjord, The Automobile Liability Policy Today, 1956 Proceedings, Section of Insurance Low, American Bar Association,
61, 90; Risiord and Austin, Who Is "The Insured" Revisited, 28 Ins. Counsel J. 100 (1956); Risiord,
1960 Highlights of Automobile Insurance Low, 12 Fed. of Ins. C. Quarterly 41, 56; Brown and Risjord, Loading and Unloading: The Conflict Between Fortuitous Adversaries, 29 Ins. Counsel J. 197,
207-211, 216 (1962).
12 "The term 'the Insured' is used severally and not collectively."
13 "The insurance . . . applies separately to each insured against whom claim is made or suit
is brought."
14 Federal cases are classified by state since the federal jurisdiction is invariably diversity, so
that, since 1938, on matters involving substantive law, the federal court is bound to follow state
law, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
15 Curran Development Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 194 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Ark. 1961); Curran v.
Security Ins. Co., 195 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Ark. 1961), R. & A. Case 2319; contra Employers Mut.
Liab. Co. v. Houston Fire & Cas. Co., 194 F. Supp. 828 (D. La. 1961), 213 F. Supp. 738 (D. La. 1963),
R. & A. Case 2310.
16 Kaifer v. Georgia Cas. Co., 67 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1933), R. & A. Case 936; Rollo v. California
State Auto. Ass'n, 323 P.2d 531 (Cal. App. 1958), R. & A. Case 1580; Pleasant Valley Lima Bean
Growers and Warehouse Ass'n v. Cal-Form Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App. 2d 126, 298 P.2d 109 (1956),
R. & A. Case 156.
17 Stewart v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1958), R. & A. Case 1603; Pullen v.
Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 230 La. 687, 89 So. 2d 373 (1956), reversing 72 So. 2d 353 (La. App.
1954), R. & A. Case 932; Spurlock v. Boyce Harvey Mach., Inc., 90 So. 2d 417 (La. App. 1956), R.
& A. Case 132.
18 Travelers Ins. Co. v. American Fid. & Cos. Co., 164 F. Supp. 392 (D. Minn. 1958), R. & A.
Case 1667, applying Wisconsin law.
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Jersey, 19 New York,2 0 Oregon,21 Pennsylvania,2

2

and Wisconsin, 2

thirteen have misapplied the exclusion to deny coverage in situations where the companies intend that there be coverage: Alabama ,24 Florida ,25 Georgia 2 6 Illinois, 27 Indiana, 2s Kentucky,29 Maryland,3 0 Mississippi,31 Missouri'32 South Dakota,"3 Tennessee,' 4 Texas,35 and Washington.' 6 Ohio is in doubt - two state courts have
properly held that the exclusion does not apply,' 7 but, in a later
case, the Sixth Circuit on appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Ohio applied the exclusion.'8
Twenty-seven jurisdictions seem to be uncommitted. It is amazing
that the courts, usually disposed to decide coverage questions
against the insurer wherever possible, are tending more and more
to disregard the stated Underwriting Intent of the companies and
to hold that there is no coverage under situations where the
companies expect to grant coverage.
D. United States of America

Since the automobile policy purports to cover, as insured,
any person or organization which may be liable for the acts or
19 Maryland Cos. Co. v. New Jersey Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 28 N.J. 17, 145 A.2d 15
(1958), affirming 48 N.J. Super. 314, 137 A.2d 577 (1958), which reversed 43 N.J. Super. 323, 128
A.2d 514 (1957), R. & A. Case 1398.
20 City of Albany v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 7 N.Y.2d 422, 165 N.E.2d 869, 198 N.Y.S.2d 303
(1960), reversing 8 App. Div. 2d 247, 187 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1959), R. & A. Case 1816; Greaves v. Public
Service Mut. Ins. Co., 5 N.Y.2d 120, 155 N.E.2d 390, 181 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1959), affirming 4 App. Div.
2d 609, 168 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1957), which reversed 156 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Special Term 1956), R. & A.
Case 935.
21 Canadian Indem. Co. v. State Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 174 F. Supp. 71 (D. Ore. 1959), R. & A. Case
1837; Cimarron Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 224 Ore. 57, 355 P.2d 742 (1960), R. & A. Case 2085.
22 Gulf Ins. Co. v. Mack Whse. Corp., 212 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1962), R. & A. Case 2691;
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 208 F. Supp. 354, 356 (E.D. Pa. 1958-1959), R. & A.
Case 2592.
23 Shanahan v. Midland Coach Lines, 268 Wis. 233, 67 N.W.2d 297 (1954), R. & A. Case 805;
Sandstrom v. Clausen's Estate, 258 Wis. 534, 46 N.W.2d 831 (1951), R. & A. Case 925.
24 American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. St. Paul-Mercury Ind. Co., 248 F.2d 509, 515 (5th Cir. 1957),
reversing St. Paul-Mercury Ind. Co. v. American Fid. & Cos. Co., 146 F. Supp. 39 (M.D. Ala. 1956),
R. & A. Case 503; but see Commenls of Judge John R. Brown who wrote this opinion for the Fifth
Circuit: Brown and Risiord, Loading and Unloading, The Conflict Between Fortuitous Adversaries, 29
Ins. Counsel J. 197, 216 (1962); and Brown, concurring, American Ag. Chemical Co. v. Tampa Armature Works, 315 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1963), R. & A. Case 2749. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Carroll,
271 Ala. 404, 123 So. 2d 920 (1960), R. & A. Case 2109.
25 Michaels v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 129 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1961), R. & A. Case 2259.
26 Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Mosaic Tile Co., 101 Ga. App. 701, 115 S.E.2d 263 (1960), R. & A.
Case 2051.
27 Ferrell v. State Auto Ins. Ass'n, 303 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1962), R. & A. Case 2548; Michigan Mut.
Liab. Co. v. Continental Cos. Co., 297 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1961), R. & A. Case 2404; General Ac. Fire
& Life Assur. Corp. v. Brown, 181 N.E.2d 191 (111.
App. 1962), R. & A. Case 2470; Heape v. Bituminous
Cas. Co., 182 N.E.2d 918 (111.App. 1962), R. & A. Case 2519.
28 Clark v. Travelers Ind. Co., 313 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1963), R. & A. Case 2732; United States
Fid. & Guar. Co. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 299 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1962), R. & A. Case 2450.
29 Liquid Transporters, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 308 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1962), R. & A. Case
2636; Kelly v. State Auto Ins. Ass'n, 288 F.2d 734 (6th Cir. 1961), R. & A. Case 2250; Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Ohio Farmers Ind. Co., 157 F. Supp. 54 (W.D. Ky. 1957), aff'd 262 F.2d 132 (6th Cir. 1958), R. & A.
Case 1538.
30 Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.A. v. Malisfski, 46 F. Supp. 454 (D. Md. 1942), aff'd Malisfski v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.A., 135 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1943), R. & A. Case 797.
31 Benton v. Canal Ins. Co., 241 Miss. 493, 130 So. 2d 840 (1961), R. & A. Case 2278; Continental
Cos. Co. v. Pierce, 170 Miss. 67, 154 So. 279 (1934), R. & A. Case 953.
32 Campbell v. American Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 238 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1956), R. & A. Case 792;
Hanover Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding Dept., Travelers Ind. Co., 210 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Mo. 1962),
R. & A. Case 2666; Simpson v. American Auto. Ins Co., 327 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. App. 1959), R. & A. Case
1877.
33 Birrenkott v. McManamay, 65 S.D. 581, 276 N.W. 725 (1937), R. & A. Case 937.
34 Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 212 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Tenn. 1962),
R. & A. Case 2718.
35 Transport Ins. Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of Texas, 161 Tex. 93, 337 S.W.2d 284 (1960), reversing
Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. Transport Ins. Co., 324 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), R. & A.
Case 1802.
36 Associated Indem. Corp. v. Wachsmith, 2 Wash. 2d 679, 99 P.2d 420 (1940), R. & A. Case 422.
37 Employers Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 167 N.E.2d 142 (Ohio C.P. 1959), R. & A.
Case 2008; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Buckeye Union Cos. Co., 160 N.E.2d 874, (Ohio C.P. 1959); aff'd 112
Ohio App. 386, 173 N.E.2d 173 (1961); aff'd 172 Ohio St. 507, 178 N.E.2d 792 (1961), R. & A.
Case 1866.
38 American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.A., 308 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1962), affirming
195 F. Supp. 648 (S.D. Ohio 1961), R. & A. Case 2324.
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omissions of any other person insured by the policy, the question
has arisen whether the United States is a "person or organization"
so insured under a policy issued to cover the automobile of a
government employee using his automobile on government business. New Hampshire has held that the United States is neither
a "person" nor an "organization" and is therefore not insured
under the omnibus clause of such a policy,3 9 but two federal courts
in later cases have held that the United States is an "insured"
under the omnibus clauses of automobile policies issued to cover40
automobiles owned and used in the postal service by mailmen.
After those cases the Federal Tort Claims Act was amended
to, in effect, make an action against an employee of the United
States an action against the United States, itself, under the Tort
Claims Act. 41 Apparently, one of the purposes of the legislation
was to reduce the premium charges required for insuring automobiles owned by government employees and used in government service. The insurance response is an endorsement to limit
the coverage no longer needed. The endorsement reads as follows:
It is agreed that the policy does not apply under the Liability Coverages to the following as insureds:
1. The United States of America or any of its agencies;
2. Any person, including the named insured, with respect
to bodily injury or property damage resulting from the
operation of an automobile by such person as an employee of the United States Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, if the provisions of Section 2679 of Title 28, United States Code
(Federal Tort Claims Act), as amended, require the
Attorney General of the United States to defend such
person in any civil action or proceeding which may be
brought for such bodily injury or property damage,
whether or not the incident out of which such bodily
injury or property damage arose has been reported by
or on behalf of such person to the United States or the
Attorney General.
No cases have yet been reported interpreting this endorsement
or its effect on coverage for the mailmen, the United States or
others.
III.

NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE

The most unusual case on record with regard to omnibus coverage as applied to a non-owned automobile arose in Colorado. A
passenger in the automobile involved in the accident ("accident
car") was insured in a policy issued to him covering his liability
arising out of the use of a non-owned automobile and covering as
"insured" any person or organization "legally responsible" for such
use. The driver of the "accident car" had no policy of his own. The
"accident car" was covered by a policy running to its owner and,
of course, containing an omnibus clause affording coverage to any39 Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Manson, 94 N.H. 389, 54 A.2d 580 (1947), R. & A. Case 97.
40 Irvin v. State Auto Ins. Ass'n, 148 F. Supp. 25 (D. S.D. 1957), R. & A. Case 1404; Rowley
v. American Cas. Co., 140 F. Supp. 295 (D. Utah 1956), R. & A. Case 583.
4128 U.S.C.A. § 2679 (1962).
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one "using" it with permission. The prospective "driver" and "passenger" spent the evening at the home of the owner of the "accident
car." The "passenger" obtained permission to use the "accident car"
to drive the "driver" home, but they left the owner's house with
the "driver" operating the car. There was a collision, with injuries
to persons in another car. The injured sued the "driver," the "passenger," and the "owner" of the "accident car." The "owner" was
dismissed on motions by the injured. Apparently for lack of proof
that the "driver" was the agent of the *'passenger," the court dismissed the action as against the "passenger," and entered judgment
against the "driver" alone. After collecting the policy limit from
the "owner's" insurer, the judgment creditors sued the "passenger's" insurer claiming that the passenger was "using" the (as to
him) non-owned automobile.
The District Court for the City and County of Denver (the
same judge who had dismissed the damage suit as against the "passenger" on the ground that the driver was not his agent) entered
judgment against the "passenger's" insurer, holding tnat, since the
''passenger" was "using" the (as to him) non-owned automobile,
the "driver" was a person "legally responsible" for the "use" of the
"accident car" by the "passenger," and that the "driver" was accord42
ingly covered, as an "insured" under the "passenger's" policy!
During appeal by the "passenger's" insurer, the cases were settled,
so that (unfortunately) they never reached the Supreme Court of
Colorado.
Under the policy, the legal obligation of the insured (to be
covered) must arise out of the use of the automobile. While the
"passenger," as using, was covered, he was held not liable. The
"driver" would have been covered to the extent that he was "legally responsible" for the use of the automobile by the "passenger."
The "passenger" was undoubtedly using the automobile, but how
could the "driver" have been "legally responsible" for that use by
the "passenger" when the same court had held that even the "passenger" was not liable for his "use"? How can one be vicariously
liable for the use by another who was not at fault and is not liable
for his own use? The "driver's" legal responsibility arose from the
"driver's" use of the automobile and, as to that use, he was not insured under the "passenger's" policy.
Partly to avoid a recurrence of the result in that Colorado case,
the recent revisions of the standard provisions have tried to make
it clear that the "person or organization" to be insured under parts
(a) (3) or (b) (3) (as set forth early in this article) is insured
only with respect to liability because of the acts or omissions of
a person insured under (a) (1) or (2) or (b) (1) or (2), as the case
may be, and is not (as was held in Colorado) insured for liability
arising from his own acts or omissions.
It must be remembered that, if the "driver" here, with no policy of his own, was covered for his use of the non-owned automobile under the family policy of the "passenger," merely because the
"passenger" was in the vehicle, then in another case where there
42 Alberta v. Kling, Civil No. B-26531,
Denver (1960), R. & A. Case 2169.

B-25830, and B-26842 District Court, City and County of
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might be five "passengers," each with a family policy, riding in the
vehicle, another "driver," without a policy of his own, would be
covered under each of the five "passenger" policies with policy
limits five times the average policy limit on the five "passenger"
policies, and all in addition to and in excess of his coverage under
the "owner's" policy, if any.
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INSURER'S LIABILITY IN EXCESS OF COVERAGE
By

ROBERT

E.

MCLEAN*

Millions of dollars are paid in premiums every year for liability
insurance coverage. Yet, very few policy holders have any conception of the provisions, terms and conditions of the policy for which
they pay. For example, the standard liability policy contains the
following language:
With respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy
for bodily injury liability and property damage liability,
the company shall:
(a) defend any suit against the insured alleging such injury . . .and seeking damages on account thereof, even if
such suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent; but the company may make such investigation and settlement of any
claim or suit as it deems expedient . . I
This places upon the company the duty to defend any action
brought against the policy holder, but the policy holder is sometimes astounded to learn that this same clause gives the company
the absolute right to pay or settle any claim made against him without regard to his culpability and even over his strenuous objections.
In some respects, the insured is thus at the complete mercy of the
insurer. He is provided with counsel chosen by the company. He
can neither direct nor interfere in the investigation. He may not
settle directly with the claimant, nor even insist that settlement
be made by the company. However, during every stage of the proceedings he must give full aid and cooperation to the company.
This does not become particularly burdensome to the insured, nor
cause him any great concern, until such time as he is sued for damages in an amount in excess of his protection under his liability
policy. If the claim is settled within the maximum limits of the
insured's coverage, the company has fulfilled its obligations and
the insured has nothing to worry about. What happens, however,
if the company either fails or refuses to settle the claim within the
policy limits?
This problem is not new to the law, but, with the passing of
time, it has become more complex. This is due in part to the fantastic increase in the manufacture and ownership of instrumentalities of injury with resulting liability. It is also due to the almost
universal education of the public by insurance companies to an
awareness of the need for insurance. Whether or not these same
companies could foretell the seriousness of the situation they fostered is a matter of conjecture. Certainly the early interpretations
of these liability policies by the courts uniformly favored the insurer. But this, as we shall see, has all changed.
One of the first cases to construe the duty to defend clause of
an insurance policy was that of Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity
and Cas. Co." in 1899. The court, in ruling in favor of the insurance
* Partner in the Denver firm of McLean and McLean.
1 Patterson and Young, Cases on Insurance 698 (4th ed. 1961).
2 92 Me. 574, 45 AtI. 503 (1899).
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company, held that the terms of the policy were controlling-that
they were clear and concise in their meaning-and that the company could not, under any condition, be liable for any amount over
and above that stated in the policy.
For several years thereafter, this rule was followed with even
more stringency. In New York, the courts adopted a buyer beware
attitude, holding that the policy gave the company an absolute
right to settle or not settle, to pay or not pay, which the insured
knew in accepting the policy, and, in the absence of fraudulent
concealment, the company could not be held liable for refusing to
settle a claim which resulted in a judgment being entered against
the insured in excess of his coverage under the policy.'
Other jurisdictions were committed to the same theory-that
the policy itself gave the company the right of control; 4 that the
insurer could contest an action if it chose, without responsibility
3 Aucrbach v. Maryland Cs. Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923).
4 Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 90 Atl. 653 (1914).
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for the outcome;; and while the insurer had an obligation to refrain
from doing anything prejudicial to the insured, they were not required to prejudice their own interests. If a conflict appeared, the
rights of the insured must give way. 6
A minor revolution to this obvious injustice arose in the late
1920s, when policy holders throughout the county tried to enforce
upon the insurance companies a duty to either settle the claims
within the limits of their policies or become strictly liable for any
excess judgments. This, of course, was rejected, 7 but it did result
in a more equitable approach to the matter by a majority of the
courts, and two rules of construction were adopted-one of negligence and the other of bad faith.
A. The Negligence Rule
Prevalent in any negligence case is the prudent person, the
average man, and/or the reasonable man, and the degree of care
expected of him. This same standard of care has been applied with
regard to insurance companies in negotiating and settling claims
under the negligence rule. Thus, if the company refuses or fails to
settle a claim within the policy limits, but does so in a reasonable,
prudent manner, it will not be held liable for a judgment in excess
of its liability under the policy.
This poses an interesting question. On the one hand we have
the reasonable insurance company working on its own money, and
on the other hand we have the reasonable insurance company working on the money of its insured. It doesn't take much imagination
to envision that if the limits of the policy are $5,000.00, the claim
$50,000.00 and the offer of settlement $4,500.00, no reasonable man
would risk losing $45,000.00 in order to save $4,500.00. It is quite
possible, however, if the company were assured its exposure would
be no greater than $5,000.00 in any event, that it would be reasonable to risk the $500.00 in order to reduce the $4,500.00 offer of
settlement, or even eliminate it entirely.
In Dumas v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 8 which was decided
on the basis of the negligence doctrine, in ruling against the insurer, the court said: "In deciding whether to settle, the insurer
must be as quick to compromise and dispose of the claim as if it
itself were liable for the excess verdict."9
In jurisdictions where the negligence rule is followed, the
courts have refused to extend it to define the reasonably prudent
to make settlement or pay the claim with
man as one who is going
10
someone else's money.
Kansas and Texas are the only two states which seem to adhere to the minority negligence rule, the others applying negligence
as a form of bad faith. Even in these states, the question is held to
be one of fact for the jury, as in other tort actions."
5 Mears Mining Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 162 Mo. App. 178, 144 S.W. 883 (1912).
6 Blue Bird Taxi Corp. v. American Fid. & Cos. Co., 26 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. S.C. 1938); St. Joseph's
Transfer and Storage Co. v. Employers Indem. Co., 244 Mo. App. 221, 23 S.W.2d 215 (1930).
7 Georgia Cas. Co. v. Cotton Mills Prod. Co., 159 Miss. 396, 90 AtI. 653 (1931).
8 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947).
9 Id. at 487, 56 A.2d at 60.
10 Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Lufkin-Beaumont Motor Coaches, Inc., 215 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. 1948).
11 Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933).
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B. Bad Faith
A majority of the courts have refused to accept the negligence
rule in imposing liability on the insurer for judgments in excess of
the policy limits, preferring to adopt the equally nebulous theory
of bad faith. Perhaps this is an effort to retain the contractual aspects, because it is almost always employed in an action for damages for breach of the duty owed to the insured. Thus, the insurer
who collects the premium and assumes full control over the claim
itself, as well as the litigation, also assumes the correlative duty to
act in utmost good faith. As in other contract cases, the breach of
that duty forms the basis for an action in damages by the insured.
However, interestingly enough, the courts uniformly hold that the2
action against the insurer is founded in tort and not in contract.'
In some jurisdictions, the term negligence is used interchangeably with the term bad 4faith. 13 In others, negligence is said to be
an element of bad faith.1
The term bad faith is probably as elusive of definition as the
time worn "reasonable man." However, in setting out the factual
situation which is determinative of good or bad faith, the jury is
not called upon to decide which is more reasonable, but only whether the insurer has demonstrated a lack of good faith. In this respect
it is preferable from the standpoint of the insurer.
In Burnham v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 15 it was held that a
mistake of judgment is not bad faith.
Several excellent opinions hold that the insurer has a duty to
consider the rights and the pocketbook of the insured in the same
manner as it does its own, in negotiating settlement, and failure to
do so is bad faith. 16
In Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 17 the South Carolina court went one step further in holding that good faith required
the insurer to sacrifice its own interests for those of its insured if
there was a conflict of interests. The court said that to hold otherwise would render an indemnity policy a "delusion and a snare,"
because when a conflict arose the company would always give preference to its own interests no matter what the cost to the insured.
The recent case of Smoot v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,' 8 holds
12 Ivy v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co.,

156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 320 Ins. L.J. 483 (1957).

13 7A Appleman, Insurance Law and Parctlce 562 (1962).
11 St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Martin, 190 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1951).
15 10 Wash. 624, 117 P.2d 644 (1941).
16 Ameri-on Fid. & Cas. Co. v. All American Bus Lines, Inc., 190 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1951);
American Fid. & Cas. Co., Inc. v. G. A. Nirhols Co., 173 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1949); American Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1932); Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn.
App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785 (1951).
1

Suor

roe 11.

18299 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1962).
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that the insurer may consider its own interest but may never forget that of its insured.
Where the adjustor neglected to tell his company that a verdict
in excess was probable, failure of the company to settle within the
policy limits was held to be bad faith in Johnson v. Hardware Mut.
Cas. Co.19 The court held that the adjustor, after all, was an agent
of the company and that such action was an "intentional disregard
of the financial interests of the [insured] in the hope of escaping
the full
responsibility imposed upon [the insurer] by [its] pol20
icy."
In Klefbeck v. Dous,21 the insurer discovered, after investigation, that the claim was not within the policy. The court held that
the company should have disclaimed and withdrawn at that point,
but having failed to do so, it was liable.
Failure of the company to properly investigate the case and
to prepare for trial, and the further failure to have lay and medical
witnesses available was held to be an improper defense of the interests of the insured, and evidence of bad faith, in Augustin v.
General Acc. Fire and Life Assur. Corp., Ltd.2 2 Bad faith is presumed where the insurer has notice of witnesses which it fails to
interrogate, 21 and where the investigation conducted by the insurer
is so slipshod as to prevent it2 4 from intellingently protecting the
insured in offers of settlement.
The insurer may not ignore the recommendations of settlement
made by its attorneys and adjustors,2--- nor may it escape liability
on the sole ground that it accepted and acted upon advise of counsel. 26 If the insurer has an opportunity to settle within the policy
limits after judgment in excess of 2the
limits, and fails or refuses
7
to do so, it is evidence of bad faith.
The tendency to gamble with the insured's money is usually
held to be bad faith. This is true where the insurer's liability is
clear and unequivocal,2 8 where there is less than a 50-50 chance of
winning
the case2 9 or of holding the verdict below the policy
limits, 30 or where the insurer delays settlement until the shadow
of the court house looms in the foreground, even though liability
is strong. 31
If the insurer underestimates the value of the case because of
the color, race or religion of the claimant,
this discriminatory lack
32
of foresight is tantamount to bad faith.
The insurer may not demand contribution from the insured
before
accepting an offer of settlement within its own policy lim33
its, nor may the insurer advise the insured to go south or dispose
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
20
27
2S
29
30
31
32
(1951).
33

109 Vt. 481, 1 A.2d 817 (1938).
Id. at 484, 1 A.2d at 820.
302 Mass. 383, 19 N.E.2d 38 (1939).
283 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1960).
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., supra note 16.
Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785 (1952).
Royal Transit, Inc. v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 168 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1948).
Dumas, supra note 8.
Roberts v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F. Supp. 827 (1950); aff'd 186 F.2d 921 (1951).
American Fid. & Cas. Co., supra note 16.
Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 240 Fed. 573 (1917).
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cook-O'Brien Constr. Co., 69 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1934).
Vanderbilt Univ. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 119 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. Tenn. 1952).
Roberts v. American Fire & Cos. Co., 89 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Tenn. 1950); aff'd 186 F.2d 921
Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 304 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1962).
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of all of his property, 4 without exposing itself to the dangers of
bad faith. In some instances, failure to keep the insured informed
of offers of settlement, or risk to the insured in excess of the policy
limits, may be an element of bad
faith,35 but it does not shift the
3
burden of defense to the insured. 1
The illustrations given were confined to cases in which there
was only one claimant. What happens where the policy limits are
$10,000.00 for any one person, $20,000.00 for any one accident and
$5,000.00 property damage?
This problem was considered in the very interesting and recent
case of Brown v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. 37 The U.S.F. & G.
had issued an automobile liability policy in favor of Brown with
limits of 10/20/5. Brown was involved in an accident with another
automobile and four claims were made against him, one by the
passenger in his own car, one by the driver of the other car, and
two by the passengers in the other car. The attorney representing
the two passengers offered to settle those two claims within the
$20,000.00 with the other two claimants, if such an arrangement
could be effected. While this offer was still outstanding, one company adjustor settled the claim of Brown's passenger for $6,000.00,
despite the fact he probably would have come under the limitations
of the guest statute. This left only $14,000.00 for the other three.
At approximately the same time, another company adjustor settled
the claim of the driver of the other car for $8,000.00, without even
considering the very real defense of contributory negligence on his
part. This now left only $6,000.00 to be shared by the two passen34
35
36
31

Maryland Cos. Co., supra note 30.
Springer v. Citizens Cos. Co. of N.Y., 246 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1957).
Smoot, supra note 18.
314 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1963).
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gers, who were manifestly the only ones to be seriously considered
and who, additionally, had serious injuries. Realizing the futility of
a reasonable settlement, the two passengers sued Brown and recovered judgments in excess of $45,000.00. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second District of New York held this to be a very
real demonstration of bad faith on the part of the insurer, and
Brown received judgment against the company for the full amount.
There are other cases as interesting and informative from
many jurisdictions. Unfortunately, the question has not been
decided by the Supreme Court of Colorado. One comparable case
has been decided by the Colorado Supreme Court. In Kesinger
v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co.,3S the insured was faced with a
claim which he obviously thought had merit. The company was
advised of the claim by the insured, and by the attorney for the
claimant, in an attempt at settlement. The company replied that
it "was not interested." Thereupon the insured undertook to settle
the claim himself, and then sued his insurance company for the
amount he had paid. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the
insured could not settle the claim himself and then hold the
company liable. It further held that even though the company
may not have been "interested" in the claim or in settling it, this
was not a refusal to defend, nor was there anything to defend
inasmuch as suit had not been filed.
The opposite result was reached in Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.
v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co.,3 9 and in Evans v. Continental Cas. Co.,40
where settlement was effected by the insured after the insurer,
in both cases, refused to make settlement, and in spite of the fact
that the policies provided that no acion could be mainained against
the insurers until the insureds' losses had been determined by
final judgment.
Correlative to the main issue here is (1) whether the judgment creditor may maintain the action for the excess, and (2)
whether the insured must pay the excess judgment before instituting his action against the insurer. Because of the importance of
these factors in their relation to the primary litigation against the
insurer, they will be briefly discussed.
A. Action by Judgment Creditors
A split of authority exists as to whether the plaintiff in the
original action may maintain an action directly against the defendant's insurer, in the absence of assignment. Some policies
provide that if an execution against the insured for a final judgment is unsatisfied, the judgment creditor may garnishee the
debtor's insurance carrier. Presumably this carries with it the
same right which the insured has against the insurer for the
excess over the policy limits when the insurer has
refused or
41
failed to settle within the policy limits, in bad faith.
If there is no assignment and the policy makes no provision
for such action, it is clear from a majority of the decisions that
the judgment creditor may not maintain an action directly against
38 101 Colo. 109, 70 P.2d 776 (1937).
39 129 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1958).
40 40 Wash. 2d 614, 245 P.2d 470 (1952).
41 Kleinschmit v. Farmers Mut. Hail Ins. Ass'n, 101 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1939); Auto Mut. Indem.
Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938).
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the insurer for the excess. 42 This would seem to be the correct
rule, because there is no contractual relationship between the
claimant and the insurer, and thus no duty to settle.
B. Necessity for Payment Prior to Suit
Very few jurisdictions require the insured to pay the full
amount of the judgment before bringing an action against the
insurer for the excess over the policy limits, where there has
been a lack of good faith on the part of the insurer in settling
within the limits of the policy coverage. This is based on the
theory that when judgment is entered against the insured, he
has been damaged to that extent and his liability is fixed. 43 While
there are no cases directly in point, it can be assumed that Colorado would follow the majority of other jurisdictions in this
respect.
The concern once borne solely by the insured, as a result of the
decisions in the early cases, is now shared by the insurer. In some
instances companies are pitted one against the other in an effort
to escape the blame. 44 Insurance companies have been and are
making desperate attempts to stem the tide of the decisions adverse
to the once sacred right they held-to absolutely control litigation
without responsibility.
In American Fid. & Cas. Co., Inc. v. G. A. Nichols Co., 45 the
company caused to be inserted in its standard policy the following
clause:
No action shall lie against the Company for penalty because of the refusal or failure of the Company to pay or
satisfy any demands or offers of settlement-even though
such demands or offers of settlement be within the Limits
of Liability of the policy....
Admittedly clever! However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit gave little credance to the effectiveness
of the clause. The court held that it would be contrary to public
policy under Oklahoma law. In any event, such a clause would
not bar recovery for actual damages suffered from a breach of
duty.
Liability of the company for excess over the policy limits, for
failure to settle within the policy limits, should be called the
"hidden protection clause," in view of the recent decisions. It
doesn't appear in the policy-not even in the fine print-but it's
there just
the same. By judicial fiat, the equities have been
46
restored.
42 Wessing v. American Indem. Co. of Galveston, Tex., 127 F. Supp. 775 (D. Miss. 1955); Canal
Ins. Co. of Greenville, S.C. v. Surgis, 114 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1959); Duncan v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas.
Co., 91 N.H. 349, 23 A.2d 325 (1941); Murray v. Mossman, et. al., 355 P.2d 985 (Wash. 1962).
43 Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 312 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1963); Comunalt v.
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
44. Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. Am., 250 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1962).
45 Supra note 16.
46 Author's Note: Many articles have been written, and authorities quoted, on this subject. The
author, with good reason, has been limited as to scope and space, so that some of the more exhaustive treatises have been deleted. They are cited here for the benefit of the reader:
40 A.L.R. 2d 220.
68 A.L.R. 2d 883.
38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 20 (1941).
45 C.J.S. Insurance § 936 (1946).
O'Brien, Liability Beyond the Policy Limit, 20 Ins. L. J. 525 (1955).
Keeton, Ancillary Rights of the Insured Against His Liability Insurer, 28 Ins. L. J. 395 (1961).
Wymore, Safequarding Against Claims in Excess of Policy Limits, 28 Ins. L. J. 44 (1961).
Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility For Settlement, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1136 (1954)
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OTHER INSURANCE CLAUSES - MULTIPLE COVERAGE
By
I.

GORDON

H.

SNOW*

INTRODUCTION

When two or more insurance companies become exposed to
a single loss or claim as a result of policy language which extends
their respective coverage to the loss, it is frequently stated that
there exists the problem of "double coverage."
Where inconsistent "other insurance" clauses exist, the problem is a difficult one and usually comes into focus where "A"
carries liability coverage on his car with "drive other cars" protection and at the time of the accident he is driving "B's" car,
who also carries liability coverage which contains a so-called
omnibus clause,' which extends protection to anyone driving
"B's" car with the permission of the named insured. For immediate inquiry is the problem as to which insurance company will
cover the loss or claim, or, in other words, protect the liability
of "A" (and incidentally "B" if he becomes involved in the litigation which may result from the accident in which "A" was involved).
A determination of this perplexing program will probably
bring into play the following provisions of the policies in force:
1. Other insurance clauses;
2. Proration clauses;
3. Policy limit provisions;
4. Certain exclusions contained within the contracts of
insurance which limit or vitiate coverage while the
automobile is being used for a non-covered purpose.
A detailed discussion of the problems presented under these
provisions will be made subsequently. Meanwhile, suffice it to
say that much confusion and uncertainty in the law result from
the court's attempt to reconcile the problem. It is proper enough
to refer to this situation as a problem of double coverage but it
is manifestly enlarged when more than two insurance carriers
become exposed, in which event we are no longer thinking in
terms of "double coverage." A more appropriate term to apply
to this perplexing situation would be "multiple coverage" or
''concurrent insurance."
Just how confused and exasperated our courts are becoming
when presented with these hypertechnical problems where the
issue of multiple coverage exists, is manifestly demonstrated in
the court's opinion
in the case of American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Trans2
port Indem. Co.

This is another of the plethora of cases coming to the
courts in which insurance carriers engage in an internecine
struggle to determine which carrier should discharge a loss
under primary and "excess" coverage provisions. In en* Senior Vice President and General Counsel,
Pacific Indemnity Group, Los Angeles; PastPresident, International Association of Insurance Counsel.
1 The insurance afforded by this policy applies to any person or organization using or legally
responsible for the use of the automobile provided said automobile is used with the consent of
the name insured.
2200 Cal. App. 2d 543, 19 Cal. 558 (1962).
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tering the legalistic labyrinth of the provisions of the
policies, we are not favored, like Theseus, with any thread
of principle; each case apparently presents a particularistic
and unique problem. The obscurities of overlapping coverage have, indeed, led some experts to urge legislative clarification. In the absence of such statutory definition, our
efforts in interpreting the policies in this case have led us,
with one exception as to the apportionment of liability, to
the same basic conclusion as the trial judge.
A law review article,3 referred to by the judge in the abovecaptioned case, contained the following language:
Faced with the maze created by the policy provisions,
statutes, and varying concepts of the industry, it is not difficult to see why the courts have been unable to evolve a
rule which can establish tiers of liability for the insurers
and at the same time cover most of the situations in which
the problem arises. The clause matching method has proven
to be as unsatisfactory a solution as the earlier formulas
it replaced. Attempts to find the answer in a presumed
intent of the insurers, in the absence of binding contractual
relations between them, can only result in a case by case
handling of the conflicts.
In the absence of a solution through the policies themselves, legislative action appears to be the best remedy....
Such legislation should be directed toward producing
the greatest stability without needless duplication of administrative handling. Statutory control of the "other insurance" clauses appears to be the approach which will produce this result without undue complexity.
Much has been written on this subject and consequently the
law has frequently been exhaustively discussed. There would seem
to exist no prime need for exhaustive research and, as a result,
there can be no fresh and scintillating approach to the subject.
It shall, therefore, be the purpose of this material to cover the
law rather thoroughly to serve as a review and an exhaustive
reference to the authorities and, perhaps even more particularly,
to emphasize the nature of the problems, to call attention to the
reasons for the situations which lead to the problem and to
3 Russ, The Double Insurance Problem -

A Proposal, 13 Hastings L..

183, 191 (1961).
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generally discuss the matter from the viewpoint of the insurance
carrier.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

How is it possible for insurance companies to create situations
which conclude in such a seemingly hopeless myriad of legal red
tape and confusion? Even though it may appear that the carrier
by deliberate design has set out to entrap the unsuspecting public
and to otherwise jettison our courts by flooding them with insoluble legal problems, far be this from the truth. On the contrary,
it is out of spirit and purpose to provide the public with greater
protection, true, perhaps, dictated by competitive pressures in
the industry that the insurance companies have "opened" their
policies to offer greater protection in a wide variety of circumstances heretofore never contemplated. In so doing, it soon became
apparent that in extending coverage, there would be situations
where such extended coverage would carry over into areas otherwise protected by the policies of other insurance companies; and
even though there existed a genuine, sincere desire on the part
of the insurer to offer greater protection to the insured in a variety
of situations, it was not the purpose of the insurer to create a
situation where another insurer would gain incidental benefit
from the extended coverage offer to the extent that the carrier
would escape its liability altogether.
Hence the adoption of "other insurance" clauses designed to
overcome this problem which we today recognize as pro rata,
excess and escape clauses, so-called. The introduction of proration provisions and restricted use exclusions became a common
practice also in an effort to permit giving the insured greater
protection in a variety of situations without picking up a liability
which properly another carrier should take on and for which that
carrier received an adequate premium.
It has been urged by insurance company executives and in
some cases supported by the courts,' that where multiple coverages exist, they should be held invalid because of the moral hazard
which is manifest. This argument appears on its face a specious
one for, while there may exist this problem in direct property
insurance cases where an insured could collect two or more
times for the same loss, certainly such would not be the case
with reference to liability coverages where the issue being litigated is the legal liability of the insured wherein the insured
naturally receives no direct benefit other than to be secured or
not, as the case may be, against financial loss. The most that
could be said in the case of liability coverages is that the limits
have been increased as a result of the existence of multiple coverage, because this in itself should present no problem as the insured
is entitled to the limits for which premium has been paid.
The earlier cases in some instances permitted a totally inequitable result where an insured was entitled to the protection
of two policies but where each policy contained other insurance
escape clauses. The court, by literal interpretation, held that the
4 New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co. v. Morris Plan Bank of Portsmouth, 136 Va. 402, 118 S.E. 236 (1923).
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insured was entitled to no protection.i The inequity of this situation is immediately apparent, bearing in mind the fact that double
premium was paid for which no coverage was received. Presentday courts will in every instance strive to overcome this type of
inequity, for it is fully recognized that when an insured is penalized
for carrying too much insurance, it frequently results in a penalty
being imposed upon the innocent third party victim who is faced
with the problem of prosecuting his claim against frequently an
otherwise financially irresponsible wrongdoer. In other words,
the present-day courts tend more and more to view liability insurance contracts de facto as contracts made for the benefit of
third persons.
Even more difficult of solution is the residual inequity that
results from two insurers being in conflict, because of conflicting
other insurance clauses, as to their status concerning their respective contributions, if any, to a loss. Each admits he owes something or admits that he would owe the entire loss if it were not
for the existence of the other carrier's participation.
Frequently, feeling compelled to protect its legal position,
neither carrier will consent to a participation in liquidation of this
claim other than on its own terms, usually unacceptable to the
other carrier. This has the practical effect of creating a temporary
status of no insurance until the conflict has been resolved. Meanwhile, the insured and/or the claimant is left to his devices in
filing an action for breach of contract or he may unwittingly
become a party in an action or actions by the insurers for declaratory relief wherein the insurers seek to resolve their respective
differences during or before pendency of the case in chief by the
injured claimant. This unwholesome atmosphere gives rise to
unwarranted delay in liquidating the injured claimant's case,
often working a hardship upon him, and further tends to impose
upon the insured and the injured claimant costly and time-consuming litigation. Suggestions concerning a solution to this problem
will be made in the concluding paragraphs of this material.
III. THE PROBLEM
There are innumerable situations, far too many to permit an
exhaustive discussion herein, which lay the foundation for creation
of a problem and consequent litigation. However, for purposes of
this material, a discussion of a few basic factual situations will
highlight the problems presented:
1. "A" insured his automobile with "X" insurance
company with limits of $10,000/$20,000 (which policy contains a drive-other-car provision, and a pro rata, excess, or
escape clause). He has an accident while driving a truck
owned by "B" (assuming permissive use of the truck by
"B"), which is insured with "Y" insurance company with
limits of $50,000/$100,000 (which policy contains, among
other things, a standard omnibus clause and a pro rata, excess, or escape clause).
Query: Which company is liable to "A" and for what
limits?
5 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Copeland, 90 Ala. 386, 80 So. 48 (1890).
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2. "A," while operating "B's" vehicle (a truck), calls
at the premises of "C," a manufacturer of automobile parts,
who carries a general liability policy with "Z" insurance
company with limits of $100,000/$300,000 (which covers
use of automobiles on the insured premises and also contains a pro rata, excess, or escape clause). While assisting
"A" loading auto parts on the truck, one of "C's" employees
drops an object on "D," a passing member of the public,
who sues "A," "B," "C," and "C's" employee. "C" reports
the suit to "X," his insurance company, who in turn tenders the defense of the case to the insurers of "A" and "B"
under the famous lima bean case 6 on the theory that the
accident arose out of the loading and unloading provisions
of their policies, and therefore, "C" is entitled to primary
protection from "X" and "Y" insurance companies.
Query: Which carrier is liable to "C" and "C's" employee, and for what limits?
The answer to these questions will firstly depend
upon whether the state wherein the action is tried follows
the rule of the lima bean case. Thereafter, the liability of
"X" and "Y" will depend upon the other insurance clauses
which exist in their respective policies. Finally, assuming
the policies of "X" and "Y" insurance companies are exhausted, are "C" and "C's" employee entitled to excess coverage in "Z" insurance company?
3. "A" owns a commercial building containing three
stores rented to "M," "N," and "0." He carries a general
liability policy with "X" insurance company. "M," "N," and
"0" each carry general liability policies. "A" desires to sell
the building to "B," a banking institution, who purchases
same and simultaneously agrees to re-lease the building
back to "A" as a managing lessor. "B" carries general liability insurance. In the contract of lease-back, there is a
provision for right of re-entry by "B" onto the premises for
purposes of inspection of the total premises, including the
right to inspect the boiler plant which supplies heat to the
building. 7 Further in the contract of lease-back, there is a
6 Pleasant Valley Lima Bean Growers & Warehouse v. Cal-Farm Ins. Co.,
298 P.2d 109 (1956).
7 Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38 Cal. 2d 375, 240 P.2d 580 (1952).
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provision whereby "A" agreed to provide acceptable insurance running in favor of "B" with limits of $100,000/$300,000. This he failed to do, carrying insurance only to protect
himself. Further in the same contract "B" agreed to supply
a boiler to heat the premises which "A" agreed to maintain
and operate. In the revised leases from "A" to tenants
"M," "N," and "0" there was a provision whereby said tenants agreed to carry liability insurance running in favor
of "A," which they did, with limits of $100,000/$300,000;
and further there was a provision that said tenants "M,"
"N," and "0" would share equally with sublessor "A" the
wages of an employee to operate and maintain the boiler
equipment which supplied heat to the building.
Due to the alleged negligence of the employee, the
boiler exploded, causing heavy injury and damage to various members of the public. Suits were filed against all
interests wherein "B" tendered defense of the action to
"A" and simultaneously filed a cause of action for "A's"
failure to secure the agreed insurance as set forth in the
contract of sale of the property, and also filed an action for
indemnity against "A." Meanwhile, "A" tendered defense
of the action to the insurers of "M," "N," and '0" who in
turn filed actions of indemnity over and against "A" and
"B" upon the theory that "A" and "B" were responsible for
the furnishing and maintenance of the boiler.
Query: What are the respective rights of the parties,
and which insurers are involved in the litigation, and to
what extent?
The above three examples are actual cases, the latter two of
which, up to this point, remain unsolved. This bar-examination
type of situation is presented to you herein for the sole purpose of
demonstrating how complicated actual situations can become in
dealing wi.h this troublesome area of the rights of the respective
carriers under the various types of conflicting other insurance and
proration clauses.
There are many situations found in the authorities which bring
into play the "other insurance" clauses of two or more policies.
Some of these situations are as follows:
1. A garage liability policy and a private automobile liability
policy.8
2. A private automobile liability policy as relates to another
private automobile liability policy where the insured is driving the automobile owned by another, this bringing into
play the omnibus provisions and the drive-other-car provisions of the respective policies.9
3. The omnibus clause of a private automobile liability policy
S Kenner v. Century Indem. Co., 320 Mass. 6, 67 N.E.2d 769, 165 A.L.R. 1463 (1946).
9 Oregon Auto Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952); American
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pennsylavania Mut. Indern. Co., 162 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir. 1947); Zurich Gen. Acc. &
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1941); Continental Cas. Co. v. Weekes, 74 So.
2d 367 (Fla.1954); Travelers Indem. Co. v. State Auto Ins. Co., 67 Ohio App. 457, 37 N.E.2d 198
(1941).
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and the provisions of a hired car and the hired car or nonownership provisions of another liability policy.' 0
4. A second automobile policy as relates to a first automobile
policy which the owner believed had been cancelled. 1
2
5. A conditional vendee's automobile policy.'
6. A comprehensive liability policy."

IV.

THE CASES

The courts sought at the outset to resolve the various problems
presented by adopting certain then-existing rules found in other
areas of law which they soon realized was not an appropriate and
proper solution. Some of the early theories or approaches to solution of the problem were as follows:
A. The Prior in Time View
In seeking to apply existing law to resolve conflicts flowing
from the existence of inconsistent other insurance clauses in "liability policies," the courts turn to numerous decisions found in
cases involving conflicting other insurance clauses in property insurance cases. It was observed that the courts in such cases had
followed the rule that the carrier having the earlier effective date
had the primary liability. 14 Later courts, however, recognizing the
futility of this approach, argued that the occurrence of the negligent
act of the assured has the effect of making both policies effective
simultaneously and thus has no bearing upon the time in which
the policy became effective.2 Most courts today have either ignored
or repudiated this theory of "prior in time."' 6
B. The Primary Wrongdoer Theory
Some of the earlier decisions were based upon the theory that
the insurer of the primary tortfeasor should respond to the primary
liability and that the insurer of anyone vicariously liable or secondarily liable would be in the position of excess coverage. While
this would appear at the outset to possess some merit, the practical
application of the doctrine
by the courts has resulted in almost an
7
impossible situation.'
C. Specific vs. General Coverage Theory
Some of the authorities have advanced in the past the doctrine
of imposing liability upon the coverage which is most specific in
10 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 108 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1940); Continental Cas. Co. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 94 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1938); American Sur. Co. of N.Y. v.
American Indem. Co., 8 N.J. Super. 343, 72 A.2d 798 (1950); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co., 190 Minn. 528, 252 N.W. 434 (1934), rehearing denied 190 Minn 528, 253 N.W.
888 (1934).
11 Vrabel v. Scholler, 369 Pa. 235, 85 A.2d 858 (1953), rehearing denied 372 Pa. 578, 94 A.2d
748 (1953).
12 Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Pacific Empl. Ins. Co., 130 Cal. App. 2d 158 (1955).
13 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 272 (D. Conn. 1953); Em.
ployers Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Pacific Empl. Ins. Co., 102 Cal. App. 2d 188 (1951).
14 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., supra note 10.
15 Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 341 P.2d 110 (1951), rehearing
denied 219 Ore. 110, 346 P.2d 643 (1951).
16 Oregon Auto Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., supra note 9.
17 Oregon Auto Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., supra note 9; American Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Penn Mut. Indem. Co., supra note 9; Employers Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Pacific Empl. Ins. Co.,
supro note 13; Consolidated Shippers, Inc. v. Pacific Empl. Ins. Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 288, 114 P.2d
34 (1941); Maryland Consolidated Cos. Co. v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 51 Ohio App. 323 (1935).
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its application to a loss as compared to the coverage which is less
specific or general in nature. This concept, perhaps borrowed from
property coverages and particularly fire insurance, actually possessed little merit or substance when applied to liability coverages
and the courts gradually refused to attempt to make the refined
distinction necessary to make the doctrine work, and thus the concept has fallen into disuse.'8
V.

OTHER INSURANCE CLAUSES AND THE COURT'S TREATMENT OF THEM

1. Pro Rata Provisions:
Under this type of provision the insurer obligates itself
to ratably share in the loss in the same proportion with
another or other carriers its limits bear to the total available coverage of all other valid and collectible insurance. 19
2. Excess Provisions:
These clauses are generally in wide use and briefly
provide that the insurance otherwise available shall be
excess over and above any other
valid and collectible in20
surance available to the insured.
3. Escape or Void Provisions:
These clauses, also in fairly common usage, provide in
substance that the insurance otherwise provided, under the
terms of the insurance contract, is null and void in the
21
event there exists other valid and collectible insurance.
The authorities indicate that unless there exists a conflict in
the other insurance clauses of two or more policies, such clauses
will normally be recognized and held valid. Problems arise, however, when a conflict in the other insurance or proration clauses
exists and it is this problem which so frequently is presented to the
courts and in consequence precipitates various and inconsistent
rulings in a variety of situations. There is, however, an emerging
uniformity in many cases where similar situations have been before our courts with some frequency. From the rules handed down
18
Corp.
supro
19
20
21

Oregon Auto Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., supra note 9; Employers tiab. Assur.
v. Pacific Empl. Ins. Co., supra note 13; Consolidated Shippers, Inc. v. Pacific Empl. Ins. Co.,
note 17.
Woodrich Constr. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.A., 252 Minn. 86, 89 N.W. 2d 412 (1958).
Cimarron Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 224 Ore. 57, 355 P.2d 742 (1960).
Continental Cas. Co. v. Curtis Publish. Co., supra note 10.
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and approved in many of these cases, certain reasonably reliable
conclusions can be deduced.
22

A. Matching or Pairing of "Other Insurance Clauses"
Many courts look with favor upon matching or pairing other
insurance clauses as a logical and equitable solution to inconsistent
other insurance provisions. Thus, if the policy contracts under consideration both or all contain excess clauses, a proration generally
is ordered.2 3 The reasoning of the courts suggests that the same
holding would obtain where conflicting contracts both or all contain escape clauses. Obviously, where both or all contracts contain
proration clauses, the courts will give effect to the language contained in those contracts and will order a proration.
There is a noticeable trend toward retrenchment from the
matching or pairing approach to solution of incompatible other insurance clauses, particularly in situations where there are more
than two policies of insurance involved and where two of them
match but a third mismatches. The courts find it difficult to reconcile which two of the clauses should be matched first and what the
ultimate fate therefore is of the insurer with a third inconsistent
clause or mismatched clause. It becomes manifest that in situations
of this kind there is absent complete equity to all parties concerned,
it having been argued in many instances that using the matching
or pairing formula results in an inequity to the insurer whose purpose it was to write a limited or contingent form of coverage at a
reduced premium, contemplating that its coverage would become
effective only after other primary coverage was exhausted. From
an underwriting standpoint, this does point up a substantial objection to this method of solving these problems but the courts have
taken a somewhat arbitrary and detached view of the insurer's
fate in such cases, arguing that if the insurance company who becomes participating at the primary level in disposition of a claimeven though he did not intend this to be the situation-did not
charge enough premium, and it is exposed, it simply made a bad
bargain and is bound by it.
In any event, the courts apparently will refuse to adopt any
formula for the reconciliation of conflicting other insurance and
proration clauses which precipitates a forfeiture in whole or in part
of any coverage which otherwise would be available. The courts
now uniformly appear to accept the premise that where premium
has been paid for coverage that coverage will be made available
to the assured without embarrassment to him in interpreting the
hypertechnical provisions of the policies of two or more insurers
which may be involved in the loss.
B. Mismatching of Other Insurance Clauses
It is in this area of the problem where we find the greatest
fluctuation of authority, demonstrated by the court's struggle to
produce a result that is consistent with the contract language and
still is equitable and compatible with the holdings of other juris22 38 Minn. L. Rev. 838 (1954); 5 Stan. L. Rev. 147 (1952).
23 Oil Base, Inc. v. Transport Indem. Co., 143 Cal. App. 2d 453, 299 P.2d 953 (1956).
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dictions. Consequently, many fluctuations are found, depending
largely upon the area wherein the litigation is brought.
1. Pro Rata vs. Excess Clause.-The majority opinions indicate
that they will ignore the pro rata clause, ordering
it to be primary
24
coverage and giving effect to the excess clause.
2. Pro Rata vs. Escape Clause.-There appears to be no uniformity in the decisions treating with this problem. Some courts
give effect to the pro rata provision, ' 5 and other courts to the escape
clause.26 The California courts, particularly, who give effect to the
pro rata clause in preference to the escape clause reach this conclusion upon the theory that lending validity to the escape clause
would cut down
the available insurance in force for which premium
2 7
had been paid.
3. Excess vs. Escape Clause.-The courts tend in this situation
to lend validity to the excess provisions rather than the escape provisions for the reason indicated above; namely, that to do otherwise
results in a reduction of the available insurance to the policyholder.
Thus the clauses are matched as though they were Excess vs. Excess, and they, therefore, become pro rata. -'8
However, there are courts who have held the escape clause
valid as against the excess clause, ignoring the fact that it precip29
itates a reduction in available insurance to the insured.
C. New Developments
1. Increased Usage of "Excess" Clauses.-We are currently
seeing an increase in the number of reported decisions wherein the
policies involved both contain excess clauses, thus requiring proration between the carriers.3 0
Those reported decisions generally involve policies written for
automobile leasing companies, but in the day-to-day handling of
claims, insurance companies are also being more frequently confronted with coverage problems wherein an insurer has substituted
a strictly "excess" clause for the "standard" clause used by most
companies on their automobile liability policies.
The effect of substituting the "excess" clause for the "standard"
clause is to distort the traditional coverage picture. Whereas normally the insurer of the automobile owner would be primarily
liable, the substitution of clauses permits such an insurer to obtain
24 Citizens Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1959); Employers
Liab. Assur. Cora. v. Fir,mrr's Fnd- Ins. Gr., 262 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1958); McFarl'nd v. Chicago
Exp., Inc., 200 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1952); American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Republic Indem. Co. of America,
52 Cal. 2d 467, 341 P.2d 675 (1959); American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 155 Cal. App.
2d 192, 318 P.2d 84 (1957), 76 A.L.R.2d 502; Speier v. Ayling, 158 Pa. Super. 404, 45 A.2d 385 (1946).
25 Peerless Cos. Co. v. Continental Cos. Co., 144 Cal. App. 2d 617, 301 P.2d 602 (1956); Air
Transp. Mfg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 91 Cal. App. 2d 129, 204 P.2d 647 (1949).
26 McFarland v. Chicago Express, Inc., supra note 24.
27 Peerless Cas. Co. v. Continental Cos. Co., supra note 25.
28 Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, supra note 9; Continental Cos. Co. v. Curtis Publish. Co., supra note 10; Grassberger v. Liebert & Obert, Inc., 335 Pa. 491, 6 A.2d 925 (1939).
29 Contirental Ccs. Co. v. Sutlenf'eld. 236 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1956); Employers Liob. Assur. Corp.
v. Pacific Empl. Ins. Co., supra note 13 - (The court in this instance, however, matched the two
escape clauses and ended up with a proration).
30 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Not. Ins. Co., 202 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. W. Va. 1962); Athey v.
Netherlands Ins. Co., 200 Cal. App. 2d 10, 19 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1962); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Torres, 193
Cal. App. 2d 483, 14 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1961); Continental Cos. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 28
Cal. Rp:r. 606 (Calif. 1963); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Continental Nati Gr., 28 Cal. Rptr. 613 (Calif.
1963).
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contribution from the insurer of a permissive user whose policy
would normally be excess.
As the companies continue to maneuver into a more favorable
position and to refine their efforts to shift their burden to other
carriers, we may see more and more companies resort to the use
of a strictly "excess" clause.
2. Apportionment of the Cost of Defense Between Insurers.While it may not be immediately apparent from a reading of the
decisions, those persons intimately familiar with the problem of
deciding whether to assume the defense of a lawsuit on behalf of
their insured or to refuse to enter such a defense with the hope that
the other carrier involved would step forward, will acknowledge
that they may have been influenced by the knowledge that in many
jurisdictions the carrier which once assumed the defense of the insured could not recover any of the expenses incurred by reason of
such defense.
Such was the law in California until a recent case in which the
supreme court specifically disapproved prior decisions which had
stated that the duty to defend was personal to both insurers and
thus, neither was entitled to divide that duty with the other.31 The
court noted that the services contemplated by the agreement to
defend are not personal but rather are for the benefit of the insurance company and for the benefit of other obligated insurers, as
well as for the benefit of the insured, and ruled that under general
principles of equitable subrogation, all obligated carriers who have
refused to defend should be required to share in costs of the insured's defense. The court also noted: "A contrary result would
simply provide a premium or offer a possible windfall for the insurer who refuses to defend, and thus, by leaving the insured to
his own resources, enjoys a chance that the costs of defense will be
provided by some other insurer at no expense to the ' company
32
which declines to carry out its contractual commitments.
Since the supreme court has resolved the issue in California,
some companies appear to be somewhat more realistic in resolving
the conflicts of coverage. While this current development applies
only in California and a few other jurisdictions ,3 it may indicate
31 Continental Cos. Co. v. Zurich Ins., 17 Col. Rptr. 12, 366 P.2d 455 (1961).
32 Id. at 18, 366 P.2d 461.
33 General Ace. F. & L. Assur. Corp., Ltd. v. Smith & Oby Co., 272 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1959);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 164 F. Supp. 261 (S.D. N.Y. 1958); Bituminous Cas.
Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 197 (D. Minn. 1954).
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a trend which may ultimately contribute generally to earlier and
more amicable settlement of coverage disputes.
Time and space will not permit inclusion of a digest of all the
cases reported in the United States on this perplexing problem.
Attention is called to the excellent work of Risjord and Austin
under the title "Automobile Liability Insurance Cases," in three
volumes, published by E. L. Mendenhall, Inc., Kansas City, Missouri. The unusual, excellent index contained in the Table of Chapters, Outline of Cases, and Supplementary Table of Cases, dated
March, 1961, contains headings 3 4under which are listed all of the
cases interpreting each heading.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

While it is not possible to extract "cookbook" rules which will
apply to every case to bring about a consistent end result, it is
nevertheless possible to form certain conclusions which appear to
be relatively dependable.
1. The courts will no longer accept such a literal interpretation
of contracts of insurance which produces the end result of voiding
or limiting the insurance coverage to the insured upon the broad
premise that the premium was paid for the total insurance and it
should therefore be made available to the insured.
2. Where inconsistent other insurance clauses are matched or
paired, they will in most cases be held to be pro rata.
3. Where inconsistent other insurance clauses are mismatched,
the courts will usually order a solution which will have for its purpose providing the full amount of insurance available to the insured as indicated in the situation set forth hereinabove.
The court's attitude with reference to the problem of other
insurance is well expressed in the Lamb-Weston, Inc. case, 35 wherein appears the following language:
"Other insurance" clauses of all policies are but methods used by insurers to limit their liability, whether using
language that relieves them from all liability (usually referred to as an "escape clause") . . . or that used by Oregon
(usually referred to as a "prorata clause"). In our opinion,
whether one policy used one clause or another, when any
come in conflict with the "other insurance" clauses of another insurer, regardless of the nature of the clause, they
are in fact repugnant and each should be rejected in toto. 36
VII.

THE SOLUTION

It has been expressed by a number of authorities that the hopeless confusion precipitated by the use of other insurance clauses
34 (1) Prorated according to policy limits; (2) Prorated according to premiums paid; (3) Prorated equally without regard to oolicy limits; (4) Prorated equitably where all policies purport to be
excess; (5) All policies purport to be excess; (6) Three policies excess of a fourth; (7) Two policies
are excess of a third; (8) One policy is excess; (9) One policy is purchased by named insured; (10)
Policyholders agree (That driver's policy will cover driver's liability while operating owner's automobile.); (11) Two insurers cover person secondarily liable; (12) One insurer as volunteer by paying
more than its share; (13) Insured as real party in interest where he settles judgment w;th funds borrowed under a loan agreement with one insurer; (14) Effect on claim expenses; (15) Effect on costs;
(16) Effect on interest.
35 Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., supra note 15.
36 Id. at 119.
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by insurance companies to prevent another insurer from incidentally benefiting from the broad coverage interwoven into these
various
policies, can only be avoided by the adoption of legisla3
tion.
Sober consideration of this suggested method of overcoming
the problems under consideration points to serious doubt as to
whether legislation is in fact a logical and proper solution:
1. There exists a myriad of situations in the underwriting of risks that require the writing of highly specialized forms of coverage which could not conceivably be contemplated by a statutory approach to the unsatisfactory
consequences resulting from these various forms of coverages.
2. The insurance industry as a private industry has
an obligation to serve the insurance requirements of the
public and as such should be prepared to write virtually
any form of coverage which is designed to meet a particular situation at a premium which is considered to be reasonable and proper under the circumstances. Any attempt
to place into government hands the responsibility which
presently rests with the insurance business as a private industry will tend ultimately to destroy the competitive advantages which naturally flow from private enterprise.
3. The existence of statutory uniform contracts will
tend to bring the insurance business closer to government
control and the ultimate capture of the industry by governmental agencies. This socialization of America's greatest
industry would change the form and substance of private
industry and would put America well on the road to the
ultimate social state.
The solution, therefore, must result from a program of selfdiscipline and self-correction which it is within the power of the
various segments of industry to accomplish in lieu of abandonment
of the problem to governmental control.
It is submitted that through the various insurance bureaus and
associations which today exist in the United States, wherein the
entire insurance industry is represented in one way or another,
there exists the capacity and the know-how to undertake an exhaustive study of the problem with the ultimate objective of adopting statements of guiding principles. This would be adhered to by
all of the industry covering all of the conceivable situations which
could result from the existence of multiple coverage and conflicting
proration clauses, and would still preserve the ability of the industry to provide special forms of coverages at appropriate premium rates.
Coupled with this formula approach to a solution of the problem should be a program for liquidation of any disputes outside the
statements of guiding principles not anticipated by the draftsmen
of those principles, through the medium of arbitration, thus removing the costly and unsatisfactory method of litigating such issues.
37 26 Ins. Counsel J. 93, 411 (1959); Russ, The Double Insurance Problem ings L.J.183 (1961); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Torres, supra note 30.
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DISCOVERABILITY OF INSURANCE LIMITS
By KENNETH M. WORMWOOD*
The main question or problem which will be covered in this
article is the problem of discoverability of insurance limits in pretrial preparation. The basis for discovery of the insurance policy
limits is based either upon Colo. R. Civ. P. 26(b) as respects the
scope of examination in a discovery deposition, or Rule 45(d) as
respects production of documentary evidence which is to be produced at the time a discovery deposition is taken. The more important of these two rules is 26 (b):
Scope of Examination. Unless otherwise ordered by the
court as provided by Rule 30 (b) or (d), the deponent may
be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the
examining party or to the claim or defense of any other
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge or relevant facts. It is not ground for
objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the
trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.'
Rule 26 (b) was copied after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and neither it nor the Federal Rule originally contained the
last sentence. The early federal decisions interpreting this rule held
that the information to be elicited from the deponent had to be evidence which would be admissible at the time of trial. As this was
not the real intent of the rule, the federal rule was modified in
1946 and then in 1951 the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure was
amended to conform with the federal amendment to the effect that:
"It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably
cal''
culated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
It should be pointed out and emphasized that under this amendment testimony which would still be inadmissible at the trial may
be elicited from the deponent in the discovery deposition, or interrogatories, if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. In other words, it
would appear clear in a reading of this amendment that testimony
which would not reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence would not be proper. This certainly was the
belief of many trial attorneys until the case of Lucas v. District
Court,3 which holds that an interrogatory as to the limits of an
automobile policy is proper and that the defendant must answer
such a question. Since this decision was handed down in 1959, most
-
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1 Colo. R. Civ. P. 26(b) as amended 1951.

2 Ibid.
3 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959).
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attorneys have assumed that in any case involving an automobile
policy the defendant, when requested, must advise as to the policy
limits. The opinion that this is not the case and that the ruling in
Lucas v. District Court is limited in its scope, is hereafter pointed
out.
The background of the Lucas case, as well as what occurred
at the oral argument, is quite interesting and most helpful in analyzing that case. 4 The Lucas case arose out of an automobile damage action in Pueblo. The plaintiff, upon taking defendant's deposition, had inquired of the defendant as to the name of his insurance
carrier and the limits of his policy. The defendant readily disclosed
the name of his carrier, with no objection from his attorney, since
there are many decisions in Colorado holding it proper on voir dire
jury examination to inquire whether or not the jurors are officers,
employees or policyholders of a specific insurance company. Certainly, with such a rule of law, the plaintiff is entitled to know
the name of the insurance company involved, so as to properly
interrogate the jury. There would be no legitimate reason for refusing to give this information, even though it would not be admissible in evidence at the trial.
The attorney for the defendant did, however, object to defendant's disclosing the limits of his policy and instructed him not
to answer. The trial court sustained the defendant's position in that
respect and the plaintiff then proceeded to the supreme court, asking the court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court
to require the defendant to answer this question. Counsel for the
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the nature of a
writ of mandamus on the ground that this was not the proper procedure to follow. An order of court was obtained authorizing a
specified time within which to file an answer brief on the question
of discoverability of the policy limits, in the event the court denied
their motion to dismiss.
Through a misunderstanding in the supreme court, the court,
after having this matter under consideration for some time, handed
down its decision, holding that the defendant was required under
Rule 26 (b) to disclose the policy limits. When the court's attention
was called to the fact that the defendant had never filed an answer
4 Editor's note: Mr. Wormwood appeared as amicus curiae on the petition for rehearing in
Lucas v. District Court, taking the position that the defendant should not be forced to disclose the
limits of his automobile insurance policy.
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brief on this issue, the court immediately granted a petition for
rehearing and also granted permission for a brief to be filed by
amici curiae. During the oral argument, it was pointed out to the
court that amicus curiae felt the opinion requiring this disclosure
was exactly contrary and opposed to the Colorado rule of law regarding supplemental proceedings in aid to execution, as provided
for under Rule 69 (d) Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure:
Order for Appearance of Judgment Debtor; Arrest. At any
time when execution may issue on a judgment, the judgment creditor shall be entitled to an order requiring the
judgment debtor to appear before the court or a master at
a specified time and place to answer concerning his property .... 5

It will be seen from this rule that the right to interrogate a
party as to his assets, which we contended included an insurance
policy, is a right that the judgment creditor has against the judgment debtor after a judgment has been obtained. In other words,
these are supplemental proceedings and not such proceedings as
are permitted prior to judgment.
It was pointed out to the court that while the particular question before it only involved an automobile insurance policy, if the
court ruled the defendant was required to disclose the limits of the
policy, it was going against the rule as to supplemental proceedings
and was simply the first wedge opening the door that would lead
to a rule of court which could eventually mean that in any damage
action a plaintiff could interrogate the defendant as to any assets
he might have even though later the defendant might be victorious
on the issue of liability. It was also pointed out that if the court's
opinion held the defendant must answer this question as to an
automobile policy, it would follow that a defendant would have
to answer this question as to any type of policy, such ag a malpractice policy, landlord and tenant's policy, or other type of insurance
which a defendant might carry. Mr. Justice Doyle, who wrote the
majority opinion, stated from the bench that the court did not intend to go that far and had limited its opinion to simply an automobile policy.
The Lucas case was a four to three decision. Mr. Justice Doyle's
majority opinion was concurred in by two other justices. Mr. Justice Sutton wrote a strong dissenting opinion, concurred in by two
other justices, and Mr. Justice Frantz tipped the scales by specially
concurring in the majority opinion. It is quite interesting to note
that prior to the Lucas decision, in 1954 when Mr. Justice Frantz
was on the district bench as a trial judge, he wrote an opinion in
the case of Kessler v. Petersen,6 wherein he held the defendant was
not required to disclose the policy limits and stated:
As the Court views it, the testimony sought to be elicited in the taking of the defendant's deposition would not
have a tendency in the remotest degree to establish the
probability or improbability of any of the allegations in the
complaint.'
5 Cofo. R. Civ. P. 69(d).
6 Civil No. A-95697, District Court, City and County of Denver,
7 Ibid.
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It should be noted that in Mr. Justice Frantz' specially concurring
opinion he changes his thinking, based solely on the fact that Rule
26 (b) allows examination as "to the claim or defense of any other
party," and states that as soon as an assured is involved in an
accident covered by his insurance policy he has a claim against
the insurance company and, consequently, the plaintiff has the
right to interrogate him concerning that claim.
Mr. Justice Doyle in the majority opinion readily agrees that
the amount of the insurance coverage would not lead to any evidence which would be admissible at trial, but seems to base his
opinion on two grounds. First, that if the limits are disclosed to the
plaintiff it will lead to a settlement of claims, and second, that:
"In the light of our Safety Responsibility Act and taking into account its objects and purposes, we are of the opinion that the inquiries concerning the existence of liability insurance and extent
of coverage are 'relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action.' ", To date there has been no other case before the
supreme court on this question of disclosure of the policy limits.
We might state that the rule in the Lucas case is not the universal rule on this point. As a matter of fact, the majority of the
states seem to hold that disclosure of policy limits prior to judgment is not proper. For instance, in the case of Jeppesen v. Swanson,9 the Minnesota Supreme Court, in ruling that the defendant
did not have to disclose the limits of his insurance policy, made
the following cogent remarks:
It would seem to us that, even though the discovery is
not to be limited to facts which may be admissible as evidence, the ultimate goal is to ascertain facts or information
which may be used for proof or defense of an action. Such
information may be discovered by leads from other discoverable information. The purpose of the discovery rules is to
take the surprise out of trials of cases so that all relevant
facts and information pertaining to the action may be ascertained in advance of trial. Where it is sought to discover
information which can have no possible bearing on the
determination of the action on its merits, it can hardly be
within the rule. It is not intended to supply information for
the personal use of a litigant that has no connection with
the determination of the issues involved in the action on
their merits. ...
Under the guise of liberal construction, we should not
emasculate the rules by permitting something which never
was intended or is not within the declared objects for
which they were adopted. Neither should expedience or
the desire to dispose of lawsuits without trial, however
desirable that may be from the standpoint of relieving congested calendars, be permitted to cause us to lose sight
of the limitations of the discovery rules or the boundaries
beyond which we should not go. If, perchance, we have the
power under the enabling act to extend the discovery rules
8 Lucas v. District Court, supra note 3, at 516.
9 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955).
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to permit discovery of information desired for the sole
purpose of encouraging or assisting in negotiations for
settlement of tort claims, it would be far better to amend
the rules so as to state what may and what may not be
done in that field than to stretch the present discovery
rules so as to accomplish something which the language of
the rules does not permit. 10
It is interesting to note that in the recent case of State v.
Elliott," the Missouri Supreme Court rejects the Lucas case, and
in so doing states:
The question presented is one of first impression in this
state. It has seldom arisen in other jurisdictions and the
cases on the subject are not in agreement. The respondent
cites People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145
N.E.2d 588; Lucas v. District Court, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d
1064, and Pettie v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 2d 680,
3 Cal. Rptr. 267. These cases reject the concept that the
information sought must be admissible in evidence and
apparently give no effect to the provision of the rule that
the matter must be reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence if the matter itself is not admissible....
The more persuasive cases from other jurisdictions have
held against requiring disclosure of policy limits. They are
better reasoned and more consistent with the primary purpose of the rules relating to pretrial discovery."12
In reading the Lucas case and the grounds set forth in the
majority opinion, the ruling of that case appears to be that the
only time a defendant should be required to disclose the limits
of his automobile policy is when such policy has been issued to
him by reason of the Safety Responsibility Act. 1 3 This interpretation of the decision is shared in A.L.R. which states, in citing the
Lucas case,
In action arising from automobile accident, since any
liability policy is subject to state safety responsibility law,
questions may be propounded in pretrial depositions as to
14
existence of liability insurance and policy limits thereof.
As a matter of fact, the interpretation of the Lucas case suggested here does not go as far as that of the A.L.R. author, who
recognizes that the Lucas case is based on the Safety Responsibility
Law, but seems to feel the case holds that "any liability policy is
subject to the State Safety Responsibility Law." It is not believed
that this is a correct interpretation.
Except for subsequent decisions by the Colorado Supreme
Court, it might be said that the Lucas case was authority for the
proposition that in any automobile policy the defendant was
required to disclose the policy limits. In the Lucas decision it did
not appear whether the defendant's policy was a voluntary policy
10 Id. at 656, 658.
11
12
13
14

363 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. 1963).
Id. at 636.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-7-19 (1953).
A.L.R.2d Supp. 911 (1962).
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or an involuntary policy, that is, one required by the Safety Responsibility Act.
In a subsequent case, Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Gonacha,15
the insurance company had denied coverage under the insurance
policy, due to misrepresentations made by the assured at the
time the policy was issued. Subsequent thereto, the injured party
instituted suit against the assured, Gonacha, and obtained judgment. Thereafter Gonacha and his judgment creditors instituted
an action against Safeco, alleging that at the time of the accident
Gonacha was insured against public liability by Safeco. The trial
court ruled that the misrepresentation by Gonacha in obtaining
the policy was not binding upon the judgment creditor, that under
the Safety Responsibility Law the liability of the insurance carrier
became absolute when the accident occurred, and that the insurance company could not raise the defense of misrepresentation
in obtaining the policy against the judgment creditor. The supreme
court reversed the lower court, holding that this was a voluntary
policy, not one required under the Safety Responsibility Law,
and that this law was therefore inapplicable. The court stated:
C.R.S. '53, 13-7-19 applies to a driver having prior accidents, who has manifested financial irresponsibility and
submits to the Director a policy "as proof" of future responsibility in order that he may continue to operate an automobile. Substantially identical enactments have been construed to apply only to "mandatory policies" as distin15 142 Colo.

170, 350 P.2d 189 (1960).
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guished from "voluntary policies." This is manifest from a
careful reading of C.R.S. '53, 13-7, commonly referred to as
'Colorado Financial Responsibility Law' . . . .
The policy sued on in the instant case was not issued as
the consequence of Gonacha's previous accident record
under the provisions of this enactment, and was not delivered to and approved by the Insurance Commissioner as assurance of Gonacha's ability to meet the demands of future
accidents. Colorado has no compulsory automobile insurance law, and the policy here considered was a "voluntary"
one. In such circumstances the trial court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiffs. 16
The Safeco case was immediately followed by Drake v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1" which was in turn followed by Western
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wann.ls In the latter case the automobile insurance
policy had a clause which excluded injuries to employees of the
insured "while engaged in his employment." Wann was injured
while working for the insured when struck by a car driven by
a co-employee. The employer had only two employees and was
not subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act. Wann sued the
employer for damages and recovered judgment, and thereafter
in a garnishment proceeding attempted to recover against the
insurance company. Wann's position was that under the Colorado
Financial Responsibility Act the company could not have such
an exclusion in its policy. The trial court agreed with Wann and
entered judgment for him. The supreme court reversed, holding
that the exclusion was proper and applicable, and as regards the
Colorado Financial Responsibility Act, stated:
Counsel for Wann urge that the exclusion provision runs
contrary to the Colorado Financial Responsibility Act
and that the contract of insurance is subject to all of the
provisions thereof. Complete answer to this is found in the
admission of counsel that taking of this insurance by
Hamacher was entirely voluntary on his part-he was
under no compulsion to have any insurance. In such a
situation the Financial Responsibility Act does not come
into play. 19
It is suggested that under the authority of the last three
cited cases when applied to the Lucas case, the trial courts, and
eventually the supreme court, should hold that the requirement
to disclose policy limits should be limited to those policies which
are required under the Safety Responsibility Act, that is, "involuntary policies," and not to policies which are not required under the
Act, that is, "voluntary policies."
As stated above, Mr. Justice Doyle, at the time of the oral
argument, indicated that the Lucas ruling was confined solely
to automobile liability policies. Other jurisdictions which have
allowed discoverability of policy limits prior to judgment have
gone further and have allowed such discoverability in other
16
17
18
19

Id.
142
147
Id.

at 175, 350 P.2d 192.
Colo. 244, 350 P.2d 566 (1960).
Colo. 457, 363 P.2d 1054 (1961).
at 460, 363 P.2d 1055.
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types of insurance policies. For instance, California has allowed
0
discoverability of the policy limits in a malpractice case.2 The
California court states in its opinion that it sees no difference
between a policy of insurance for liability for negligent practice
of the healing arts and an automobile liability policy. Further, in
California it has been held that discovery concerning liability
in a malpractice and fraud case against a
insurance is proper
1
civil engineer .2
The United States District Judge for the District of Montana
has held that such discoverability regarding policy limits may
be had as regards a boat liability policy.22 In Michigan the defendant Board of Regents of the University of Michigan was required
to disclose a liability policy obtained by the Board, and the limits
limits
thereof, for the purpose of showing that as far as 2those
3
were concerned there was no governmental immunity.
Another interesting situation arises under this subject. Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 41-2-2 (1953) provides for exemplary damages in all
civil actions, under certain circumstances. The Colorado Supreme
Court has held in several cases that where exemplary damages
are sought to be recovered in an action, it is proper at the time
of the trial to question the defendant as to his financial worth;
that exemplary damages being punitive in nature, the financial
condition of the defendant may be shown in order for the jury to
damages should properly be
determine
2 4 what amount of punitive
awarded.
With the supreme court holding that evidence of the financial
worth of a defendant may be introduced at the time of trial,
where punitive damages are sought, it would certainly follow that
the plaintiff in pre-trial discovery could interrogate the defendant
regarding his financial worth, if exemplary damages are sought.
The next question arises as to whether such discovery procedure
could include the question of the limits of the automobile insurance policy. Clearly, if exemplary damages were covered under
an automobile insurance policy then the question would be proper.
However, exemplary damages are not covered under an insurance
policy, and if in fact the insurance company attempted to cover
such damages, the provision would be void.
We have only one Colorado case involving this exact question,
Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery.25 The supreme court in this
case held exemplary damages were not covered under that particular policy, and stated:
Included in the total amount of the judgment entered
against the garnishee herein was the award of exemplary
damages against defendant Callahan in the sum of $1,000.
This award was primarily for the punishment of Callahan
for his wrongful acts and as a warning to others. It was
20 London v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App. 2d 39, 334 P.2d 638 (1959).
21 Rolf Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. App. 2d 876, 9 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1960).
22 Schwentner v. White, 199 F. Supp. 710 (D. Mont. 1961).
23 Crriste v. Board of Regents, 364 Mich. 202, 111 N.W.2d 30 (1961).
24 E.g., Starkey v. Dameron, 92 Colo. 420, 424, 22 P.2d 640 (1933) (concurring opinion); McAllister
v. McAllister, 72 Colo. 28, 209 Pac. 788 (1922); Courvoisier v. Raymond, 23 Colo. 113, 47 Pac. 284
(1896).
25 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934).
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in no wise compensation to the injured party for bodily injuries or actual loss occasioned by the negligence of Callahan. The insurance company did not participate in this
wrong, and was under no contract to indemnify against
such. In this particular matter the policy indemnifies
against damages for bodily injuries, and nothing in addition is contracted for, and there is no further liability. The
injured will not be allowed to collect from a non-participating party for a wrong against the public.26 (Emphasis
supplied.)
This is the general rule all over the United States. The most
recent decision in that respect is Northwest Nat'l Cas. Co. v.
McNulty,2 7 wherein the Federal court goes into the question fully,
holding that it would be against public policy for an insurance
company to issue insurance covering a person for exemplary
damages.
It will be seen from this article that there are still many
questions involving discoverability of insurance policy limits
which have not been decided by the Colorado Supreme Court.
It is suspected that the ingenuity of both the plaintiffs' bar and
the defense bar is such that many of these questions will eventually find their way to the supreme court for determination.
26 Id. at 17, 39 P.2d 779.
27 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
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THE COMMON MARKET:
A PRIMER FOR ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAWYERS
By
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WHY IS THE COMMON MARKET IMPORTANT?

There has been a great deal of comment in the past year about
the Common Market. It has occasioned debates in the United States
Congress and in parliaments around the world. What is it that is
causing so much attention? We know that Europe is more prosperous and that the Market is trying to lower internal tariffs. But
why should this be of such concern? After all, the nations of the
world, and particularly those of the Atlantic community, have been
raising and lowering tariffs for centuries and are constantly entering into one scheme after another related to trade. What is so special about the Common Market development?
A few figures may suggest the answer. The Common Market
is not just another tariff arrangement, dealing with a limited aspect
of the world's economy. The six nations now full members of the
Market-France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries-have
a population of 180 million people. Many of the new African states
are associated with the Market, having formerly been colonies of
member nations.' Greece has become an associate member; Great
Britian is applying for full membership.2 In what is called the "extended Common Market," which includes the nations that are very
likely shortly to become associated in one way or another, there
are about 250 million people. This is far greater than the present
population of 1853 million in the United States and 214 million in
the Soviet Union.
These countries and the United States will contain 90% of the
industrial capacity of the free world. The steel capacity of these
nations will soon be as large or larger than ours, and will dwarf
that of Russia. Their automotive and electrical production greatly
exceeds Russia's and is second only to the United States. Most importantly, the extended Market nations represent an enormous
consumer market whose buying power could well come to equal
that of the United States, which is still by far the greatest single
market in the world. As an example, the present six Market countries now account for one-third of the total world imports of farm
products, in spite 4of the fact that they produce 78% of their own
agricultural needs.
The prosperity of these countries is astonishing. From being
largely in ruins at the end of the war, the six nations have advanced
to where their present average annual increase in industrial pro* Partner in the Denver firm of Holland & Hart.
1 In 1962 there were 17 associated States, and a number of States and Colonies in other parts
of the world ere also associated with the Market. European Community Information Service, The
Facts 4 (Brussels-Luxembourg, 1962).
2 Convention with Greece of July 9, 1961, effective November 1, 1962. See Table, Status of
Common Market Membership and Association, CCH Common Mkt. Rep.
9009.
3 Population Figures derived from Porter, Time For A Giant Step, Life 102 (April 20, 1962).
4 European Community Information Service, The Common Market (Brussels - Luxembourg, 1961);
see also Porter, supra note 3.
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duction is 8%, compared with 3% in the United States. In the three
years 1958, 1959 and 1960, the Common Market nations piled up an
almost unbelievable total 25% advance in industrial production.5
The world knows the industry of these countries is booming.
Equally remarkable, but less well known, is the employment situation. Not only is there full employment in most parts of Europe,
but there is chronic overemployment in many areas. In Germany
it is common for labor scouts to stand outside the factories in the
evenings attempting to solicit workers to change jobs by offers of
interest-free loans or rent free apartments, as well as increases in
salaries. It is said that in one instance, a manufacturer was so desperate to increase his work force he actually bought an entire
separate business, closed down its operation and moved the workers to his plant. Thousands of Southern Europeans are employed in
the more industrial north, and the situation may well be on the
way to solving the chronic unemployment problems of Southern
Italy and Greece.
With all this development, the impact of the new community
of nations is just beginning to be felt. In 1960 the national income
of the six member countries was only $180 billion dollars, as compared with $503 billion income in the United States.6 A few moments consideration of these figures makes it clear that the Market
may well develop into a third industrial and population concentration in the world comparable in size and economic power to the
United States and to Russia, and far exceeding in economic power
the numerically larger nations of China and India.
The peculiar impact of the Common Market legal structure is
that it has to a great degree caused the European boom to accelerate at these rates, and it holds the key to concentrating these forces
into an effective political force.
The basic economic objectives of the Market are well known.
The members are creating a vast, single internal market by reducing and eliminating tariff and quota barriers among the Common
Market countries, and by creating a common external tariff appli5 Ibid.
6 European Community Information Service, The Common Market (Brussels -

Luxembourg,

1961).
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cable to all other outside countries. Less well known are the Market's efforts to create common economic policies for all member
countries through common rules and institutions, and its revolutionary efforts to insure the free movement of persons, capital,
firms and services among the countries.
For anyone who has had to try to get a job permit in a foreign
country as an alien, or who has attempted to enter a particular
profession or business in another country, this last point of free
movement is almost the most startling. The Common Market is
well on the way to the time when a worker from any Common
Market country may move to another country and work there without restriction, and to the point where a business enterprise may
be set up freely in any of the Common Market countries by an
entrepreneur from any other member country.'
Finally, all of the economic progress should not disguise the
fact that the aims of the Market are essentially political. Its founders definitely wanted to end the era of separate nation-states and
to lay a foundation for Europe as a single political entity. They
chose economic steps as their first practical goal, but their vision
extends to Europe as a tightly-knit, strong and democratic force
in the free world.s
The implications of this political goal, distant as it may be, are
not lost on the governments of the United States and Russia. The
preamble to the Treaty of Rome which created the Market expresses it this way:
His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the
Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the French
Republic, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal
Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty
the Queen of the Netherlands,
DETERMINED to establish the foundations of an ever
closer union among the European peoples,
RESOLVED by common action to ensure the economic
and social progress of their countries by eliminating the
barriers which divide Europe,
AFFIRMING as the essential objective of their efforts the
constant improvement of the living and working conditions
of their people,
RECOGNIZING that the removal of existing obstacles
calls for concerted action in order to guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competition,
DESIROUS of strengthening the unity of their economies
and of ensuring their harmonious development by diminishing both the disparities between the various regions and
the backwardness of the less favored regions,
DESIROUS of contributing, by means of a common commercial policy, to the progressive abolition of restrictions
on international trade,
7 See discussion in The Facts, supra note 1; and in The Common Market, supra note 4.
8 See documents collected in European Community Information Service, Political Unity in Europe
(Washington, D.C. 1962).
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INTENDING to strengthen the links which bind Europe
and overseas countries and desirous of ensuring the development of their prosperity, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
RESOLVED by the establishment of this combination of
resources to strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty
and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share
their ideal to join in their efforts,
HAVE DECIDED to create a European Economic Community ...
"One Europe" might well tip the balance of power dramatically
to the West.
II.

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN TO U.

S.

ECONOMICS?

Our country is the world's leading exporter of goods and the
Common Market is the second greatest exporter in the world. The
trade between these areas is enormous. One-third of all of our 20
billion dollars in exports goes to the extended Common Market,
and the trade back and forth is growing daily. This of course was
one great impetus behind the Trade Expansion Act, proposed by
the administration and passed by Congress in 1962, to allow the
President to reduce many U.S. tariffs drastically, including authority to reduce tariffs by over 50% or to eliminate them entirely in
some circumstances in trade with the Common Market.9 Our trade
philosophy assumes that we must continue to trade with Europe
at an ever increasing pace.
The Market is both a challenge and an opportunity to the
United States. With lowered tariffs, our manufacturers and farmers
see in Europe an area of tremendous consuming power with growing needs where American products can be sold. At the same time,
they face the challenge or threat of European goods being sold here
free, or partially free, of protective tariffs. American concerns fear
the lower labor costs in Europe, although they often forget that
our workers are still considerably more productive than European
workers because of advanced technology, and they often are not
aware that labor costs are constantly increasing in Europe, with
the demand for labor and with rising standards of living.' 0
III.

WHAT CONCERN HAS THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN
LAWYER WITH THE MARKET?

We are prone to think in the Rocky Mountain region that all
of this is most interesting, but it really has almost no impact on
our life here. This is inaccurate from at least two angles. For one
thing, recent surveys indicate that exporting is a $200 million part
of Colorado's economy, that 146 firms in Colorado export and that
26 engineering firms have done overseas engineering work, while
a great many more have an interest in obtaining such work."
9 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, P.L. 87-794, Title II (October 11, 1962).
10 18 Report on Western Europe, Europe As A Competitor (Chase Manhattan Bank, June-July
1962); CCH Common Mkt. Rep.
9015.
11 Governor, State of Colorado, Export Directory, Colorado, U.S.A. (1961); University of Colorado,
35 Colo. Bus. Rev. No. 9 (Sept. 1962).
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While Colorado leads the Rocky Mountain states, neighboring states
also have substantial export
trade. That of Kansas and Nebraska
2
exceeds that of Colorado.'
The engineering aspect is particularly striking in Colorado.
Engineering services are our single greatest dollar export, although
we do export about $48 million in various manufactured goods
yearly, and Colorado's share of total annual national agricultural
exports is about $82 million. Overseas engineering, exclusive of U.S.
work, is about a $50 million aspect of our economy, which is just
about what the entire skiing industry brings into Colorado each
year. As to people involved, surveys show that 28,430 workers in
Colorado alone are directly or indirectly1 engaged in the manufacturing and agricultural export business. "
IV.

WHEN DOES THE INLAND LAWYER HAVE TO DEAL
WITH THE MARKET?

These figures indicate a second point-there are many occasions when a Rocky Mountain lawyer will have to know something
about the Market. A client may be selling goods to the Common
Market either directly or through exporting firms. It may wish to
set up a plant in Europe for manufacturing. It may have licensing
or royalty arrangements in the Common Market countries. It may
be planning to furnish engineering services in a Common Market
country, or services which involve purchases of items in the Market
to go to an engineering job site in some other country. Another
aspect of importance is where a client already has operations in a
country that is proposing to associate with the Market, the most
notable example being Great Britian. To these examples must be
added the variety of legal problems which exporting, importing
and transportation firms have.
V.

WHAT IS THE COMMON MARKET FROM
A LAWYER'S POINT OF VIEW?

If an attorney has any of these problems, or may have them, a
few basic facts are essential. The official name of the Market is the
European Economic Community, which is a special legal relation12 Colo. League of Women
13 Supra, note 11.
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ship among the six members, created by the Treaty of Rome. 14 Of
possibly less practical importance, but equally interesting in the
whole picture, are similar structures called the European Coal and
Steel Community, and Euratom, the European Atomic Energy Community. The lawyer must realize that the treaties creating these
communities create an entirely new set of legal rules and obligations, many of which will be directly binding on his clients.
The European Economic Community, or EEC, is administered
by an Executive Commission composed of nine members acting
entirely independently of the governments of the six member nations. This group implements policy under the Treaty of Rome, and
proposes new rules which must be adopted by a Council of Ministers, which comprises one member from each of the member governments. Until recently the Council of Ministers acted only on
unanimous vote, but as of January 1, 1962 a weighted voting system
came into effect whereby France, Germany and Italy have four
votes, Belgium and the Netherlands two votes each, and Luxembourg one vote. As a consequence, most decisions, though not all,
can be made on the basis of 12 of these 17 votes. These decisions
bind the countries whose ministers dissent.'5
The EEC also has a court-the Court of Justice of the European
Communities-which hears cases involving law of the Common
Market and the Coal and Steel and Euratom Treaties. The judgments of the court are not appealable. They have the force of law
in the Community, where they are directly enforceable on private
persons, firms and governments, as well as on the executives and
personnel of the EEC. This court is extremely active, having handed
down many important decisions since first becoming operative
under the Coal and Steel Treaty.
The people of the six countries are represented more directly
in an organization called the European Parliament, composed of
36 members each for France, Germany and Italy; 14 for Belgium
and the Netherlands; and 6 for Luxembourg. Members are drawn
from the Parliaments of the respective countries, although eventually they will be directly elected by the voters. The Parliament has
very little direct power, but it may cause the Executive Commission
to resign in a body by a two-thirds vote, and it can also put parliamentary questions to which replies are obligatory.
These institutions dramatize a new era in modern legal history.
The three new communities have by treaty delegated authority
over certain aspects of their economic lives to a supranational governing organization in which they participate. The legal result is
a pattern of laws transcending boundaries and imposed in addition
to conventional application of internal law and conflict of law rules.
The contrast to traditional international law is particularly striking. Rules based ultimately on a normal international law devicethe treaty-now are applied directly to private parties, and these
parties have full standing under such rules.
14 Signed March 25, 1957; effective January 1, 1958.
15 Treaty of Rome, art. 148 (1958); The Facts, supra note 1 at 7. Certain votes of 12 must include
four countries.
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VI.

WHAT ARE A CLIENT'S PRIMARY LEGAL
PROBLEMS IN THE MARKET?

Notwithstanding all of this, it is still true that at this time a
client's chief legal concern will be with the laws of the country or
countries where it plans to operate. The EEC's chief importance
will be its economic impact on these countries, but more and more
the legal structure of the Market is coming to be of an importance
almost equal to the national laws.
Most business decisions which have something to do with the
Common Market are preceded by some sort of survey, its scope
depending on the business planned. If a question of sales or manufacture of products is involved, this may cover the market potential
of the countries, raw material and parts availability, present tariff
barriers, labor availability, competition, the wage and tax structures of the countries involved, and special incentives which may
be offered by the national or local governments. Surveys of this
kind may be conducted through market research organizations or
directly by company representatives. In either case, it is important
to get as close to the foreign situation as possible, in order to have
an accurate picture. For this reason some authorities advise using
European rather than American analysts.
Incentives for location in a particular area are less important
than they were a few years ago. However, valuable tax reductions,
low cost loans and favorable plant site arrangements may still be
made in some areas. Also not to be neglected are the advantages
of locating in one of the free port areas or even in a low tax country outside the Common Market, such as Switzerland.
Having decided generally where and what it wishes to do, the
client may turn to the attorney to find out how to do it and stay
on the right side of the law. Then the problem is one of legal planning very much resembling what must be done in the United States,
except that there will constantly be new and surprising answers
to the old questions, and one will encounter a considerably greater
problem of obtaining reliable information and advice than is available in the U.S.
An elementary check list of problems to consider might be:
1. The need for business permits and registration to do
business.
2. The legal form in which to do business, whether as a
branch of an American company, as an American or a
non-European foreign corporation subsidiary of your
client, or as a European subsidiary.
3. The impact of income and other taxes on your client,
and especially unfamiliar taxes such as the one which
is very common in Europe called the Turnover Tax.
This is a transaction tax, in effect like a continuing
series of sales taxes imposed at rather low percentages,
but levied every time goods and component parts change
hands.
4. Problems of obtaining labor and dealing with the generally greater array of social legislation in Europe covering hiring and other employment problems.
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5. Import and export permits and tariffs.
6. Antitrust and unfair competition legislation, both national and Common Market.
7. Questions concerning repatriation of funds and profits,
and currency controls.
8. Local legal arrangements, such as may be involved in
leases, transportation, billing and distribution.
The list could be expanded, but generally, if a lawyer is alert
to following up differences in treatment of these problems in different countries, he will undoubtedly find he is asking the right
questions.
VII.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND ADVICE

The more serious problem is where to get the answers. The
American lawyer will no doubt be inclined to depend on his own
efforts to try to obtain as accurate information as he can, turning
to others when necessary.
One problem here is that the inland lawyer will normally be
depending almost entirely on secondary written sources. That is,
he will be looking at tax and commerical services which abstract the
laws of the countries involved, articles in books, pamphlets and
periodicals, and results of investigations by other lawyers. Rather
rarely will he, at least at the start of his work, be able to examine
first-hand the statutes or regulations of the countries involved. 16
Our own Department of Commerce is an enormous help in this
work, since it has an entire branch devoted to helping businessmen
in their foreign dealings. This is also true of the foreign consular
corps in this country, which is delighted to give advice on doing
business in countries represented. Special publications in the export
field and materials produced by trade associations and other businesses will be a great help.
In many instances, the Rocky Mountain lawyer may feel he
should turn to another lawyer more skilled in this field. For years
it has been customary for a few firms in New York, Washington,
Chicago and some of the Texas cities to have experts in transactions
of this kind to help American lawyers. These men are still doing
this and there are probably more of them with more knowledge
than ever before. However, the pattern for the local lawyer is
changing. He is tending more and more to rely on his own efforts
and not on the advice of a few specialized lawyers in this country.
On the other hand, he usually and wisely will finally turn to
lawyers in other countries to double check his findings and to alert
him to problems he could not have found. This is particularly true
where there is a question of actually locating in a foreign country,
or, of course, when forming a foreign subsidiary or entering into
leases and purchases and other transactions governed exclusively
by foreign law.
16 However, both the Univ. of Denver and Univ. of Colo. Law School libraries, in recognition of
the growing need, have collected certain very useful materials and have plans to expand their
acquisitions.
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Dealing with foreign lawyers raises a special problem. The
practice of law naturally differs a great deal from country to country. Many European lawyers practice in a very traditional way,
which consists largely of having specific questions put to them by
clients and answering with specific written opinions, point by point.
These practitioners often are not accustomed to giving the daily
free-wheeling, broad scope of legal business advice that American
concerns have come to expect from their lawyers.
It is important to know this and to be able to find lawyers who
are practicing more in a pattern like ours, to help the American
client. This sort of lawyer definitely exists, but he is not always
easy to find. A great help in this, and also in direct advice, can
come from the foreign offices of a few American law firms who
maintain resident partners in Paris, Brussels, Rome and other chief
centers in the European community. In addition, a number of
American trained lawyers have located in these centers, specializing in giving advice to American firms entering the Common Market. These lawyers typically are extremely helpful since they recognize the problems of the American concern, but also know the
European picture, have several languages available, and know when
to employ local European lawyers for problems they cannot handle.
Certainly not to be overlooked are the international accounting
firms which maintain offices in every major center and which are
extremely useful sources of local tax and other information, as
well as being needed for more traditional accounting work.
What about written legal materials? Not long ago there was
very little available dealing with a lot of the more practical aspects
of these problems. However, now there is an ever-increasing volume of reliable material. Several loose-leaf services are available
on the tax structures of foreign countries. There are many miscellaneous law review and other legal journal articles which are often
very good,' 7 and there are several institutes producing annual volumes covering a broad range of problems in this field. Books are
being written in many fields, one of the more comprehensive being
the Harvard Law School studies in international taxation, producing, though not rapidly, thorough one nation single volume studies
of tax structure. A new and quite helpful development is the publication in 1962 of an American loose-leaf service dealing exclusively with Common Market law and called "Common Market Reporter.' u s Many volumes deal specifically with the Market and are
too numerous to mention here. However, of great significance are
the periodic publications of the Market authorities, especially the
Official Journal of the European Communities and the Bulletin of
the European Economic Community, both published in Luxembourg.
VIII.

PROBLEM AREAS

The Rocky Mountain lawyer, trying to assemble some useful
advice for his client, now has a lot of material before him and is
17 Many of these are readily available to most lawyers. For example, publications by American
Bar Ass'n Sections covering antitrust, business law, tax and comparative law, articles in the
N.Y.U. and So. Calif. tax institutes annual volumes, and the A.B.A. Journal.
18 Commerce Clearing House.
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prepared to give the advice and to point out areas where he feels
his conclusions should be checked by foreign counsel. It might be
helpful to highlight just a few special problem areas.
A. Jurisdiction and Judgment
The American lawyer will discover that some of his deeply
rooted concepts of jurisdiction may have to be readjusted. Speaking
only of Europe, several countries of the Common Market have the
rule that a plaintiff may obtain jurisdiction over a case by seizing
property of the defendant in the country, although the defendant
is not personally present. So far this corresponds with our in rem
procedure. However, in Europe the court often may give a judgment as to the entire amount of the claim, regardless of the amount
of property attached, instead of limiting the judgment as an American court would do. Then, through treaties or other arrangements
for reciprocal enforcement, the judgment may be taken to another
country and enforced without a new trial.
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Perhaps equally startling to an American lawyer is the idea
in Germany that shares of a GmbH (which is a corporate form
corresponding somewhat to our closely held corporations) are considered to have their situs in the country where the corporation is
formed, rather than where the certificates physically are, or where
the owner may be found. This causes problems in the normal parent-subsidiary relationship since, for example, a Colorado corporation with a GmbH subsidiary in Germany may itself be sued in rem
by seizure in Germany of the shares of the GmbH.
B. Employee Relations
Generally speaking, social legislation in the Common Market
countries attempts to do much more to protect the employee than
the more laissez faire legislation tradition in America, eroded as
some may feel the latter is. European codes will often specify long
periods of notice for terminating a worker, and may allow him
substantial amounts in the nature of severance pay or compensation for being fired.
Other laws and economic situations affect payrolls. One may
think the hourly wage in Europe is comparatively low, but it is not
quite so low as it may seem when one realizes that normally there
must be a 25 to 30% add-on for various payroll taxes paid to the
government, and as much as 100%add-on for fringe benefits necessary to attract workers.
C. Unfair Competition
In the United States we perhaps have the idea that the law of
unfair competition, built up as it is largely through the common
law, is rather limited in effect. However, several European countries have very elaborate codes of unfair competition which may
be a help as well as a hindrance, restricting as they do the power
of employees and others to hurt a client's business.
D. Antitrust
Probably the most extraordinary legal development in the
Common Market has been the proliferation of antitrust laws. Traditionally, Americans viewed Europe as an antitrust heaven compared to the U.S., where the government vigorously enforces our
antitrust statutes. We had the idea that cartels were considered
perfectly acceptable in Europe and, therefore, many restrictive
practices would be legitimate there which are outlawed here. This
is no longer true. Not only has almost every European country
passed some sort of antitrust legislation since the Second World
War, but the Treaty of Rome contains very broad antitrust provisions which have been implemented by adoption of a comprehensive series of regulations by the Executive Commission of the EEC.
Americans will not be surprised by the prohibited practices.
They are the same range of monopolistic and anti -competitive
agreements and actions prohibited here. More surprising, perhaps,
has been the application of these rules. Drawing upon the rather
general language of the German law on restrictive practices, the
German courts have, for example, construed almost any practice
leading to vertical price maintenance as being illegal, even in the
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absence of agreements on price maintenance or vigorous efforts to
maintain prices.19
Another feature of European competition regulation is more
helpful, although equally surprising to the American. This is that
some of the codes or statutes will prohibit a wide range of practices,
but many of these practices may be legalized by registering the
arrangement with a commission, thus in effect giving the government notice of the practice and an opportunity to weigh its effects.
Under German law, registration will prevent public or private
lawsuits on certain practices and will allow them to be carried on
urtil the government may decide they should be stopped. Similarly,
under EEC regulations, certain illegal agreements prohibited by
t-ie Treaty of Rome since 1959 may be made largely free of harmf~l effect by registration, and a request may be made that they be
permitted in the future. Thus, if there is a registration or notification, fines or other damages may be eliminated to a great extent
and it is possible the registrant will be allowed to continue, if the
Commission determines his practice really promotes trade rather
than hurting it.
E. American Tax Picture
Of course, the client will be interested in the impact of American taxes. In this area we seem to have come full circle. Only a
few years ago bills were being considered by Congress to allow
American corporations doing business abroad to be taxed only at
the foreign rate and not the U.S. rate until repatriation of profits
to the U.S. With the new administration, Congress passed in 1962
a bill which, in effect, will tax at U.S. rates even earnings of some
foreign subsidiaries of American firms, which, in many situations
under prior law, would have paid no American tax until return
of the profits. Foreign subsidiaries taxed are chiefly sales and services subsidiaries located in so-called "tax haven" or low tax rate
countries. The impact of U.S. tax is quite complicated, and one
must always consider the extensive series of treaties which the
U.S. has with other countries designed to prevent double taxation.
IX.

CONCLUSION

American lawyers will no doubt find that they have to deal
with these problems more and more in a world of larger populations and increased trade. The Common Market exemplifies an area
in which what might be called supra-national law bears directly on
the actions of individuals and firms. American tax treaties are another example. The Trade Expansion Act is a more traditional
example of the indirect legal effect negotiations between countries
can have on persons. We may well see the day when the United
States enters a situation in which multi-national or supra-national
law of this kind is of direct concern in our own country. In this
case, no doubt, foreign lawyers looking at the American scene will
be considering problems much like those facing American lawyers
in the European Community today.
19See Fed. Sup. Ct. Dec. January 14, 1960 - KRB 12/59, Reg. App. Ct., 5 Wirtschaft und
Wettbewerb 347 (1960) (BGH 369); Fed. S.C. Dec. October 8, 1958 - KZR 1/58, Dist. Ct. Cologne;
28 Dec. Fed. Sup. Ct. Civil 208 (1959), 12 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 783 (1958) (BGH 251).
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LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES:
THE CASE FOR PARTNERSHIP t
A COLLOQUIUM ON RESEARCH
IN JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
By
I.

HARRY W. JONES*
INTRODUCTION

The subject of this colloquium has been announced as "Justice
Explored." That exploratory enterprise, by the way, is precisely
what this group of scholars in law and the behavioral sciences has
been engaged in for the past three days, with the stout support
and constant participation of three case-hardened working "explorers" in the field-two distinguished members of the Colorado
judiciary and an eminent federal judge from the Second Circuit.
Altogether, there were 12 of us-by happy coincidence a group of
jury size-who deliberated at the La Garita Ranch on the Program
in Judicial Administration proposed and planned by the College of
Law of the University of Denver. I can announce this much: the
verdict at which the jurors have arrived is a cordial and hearty
"God bless you!" So, Dean Hurst and Professor Yegge, the jury
finds that what you propose is eminently worth doing. Your program will be good for the College of Law and for legal education
generally. It will be good for the administration of justice in Colorado, and, as your studies reach out to encompass problems of more
general significance, the program will be good for the administration of justice everywhere. There can never be too many workers
in the vast vineyard of judicial administration.
I could never cover my assigned ground this morning if I attempted to do very much by way of a formal definition of "justice."
Justice has many faces, ranging from the Biblical conception of justice as conformity to divine will and compassion for one's fellow
man to the conventional Anglo-American notion of justice as essentially the impartial administration of standing law. In any definition, of course, we must take account of the great "justice" concept
that has come down to us over the centuries, that justice proceeds
from the unfailing resolution of the legal order to give each man
that which is his "due."
t A summary of the findings of the Advisory Committee to the University of Denver's new Program of Judicial Administration as presented by Professor Jones at the University of Denver Law
Center, August 21, 1963. This article has also been published in the Journal of the American Judicature Society, Vol. 47, No. 5, October, 1963.
The distinguished members of the Advisory Committee, who participated in the sessions at Lo
Garita, are: Donald R. Young, president, Russell Sage Foundation; Sterry R. Waterman, judge, United
States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, and President, American Judicature Society; Albert T.
Frantz, Chief Justice, Colorado Supreme Court; Walter Gellhorn, professor of law, Columbia University, and president, Association of American Law Schools; Milton D. Green, professor of law
and associate director, Institute of Judicial Administration, New York University; Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., study director and professor of low, Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California, Berkeley; Harold E. Hurst, dean, University of Denver College of Law; Harry
W. Jones, director of research, American Bar Foundation, and professor of law, University of
Chicago; Wilbert E. Moore, professor of sociology. Princeton University; Henry E. Santo, presiding
judge, Denver District Court; Glen R. Winters, executive director, American Judicature Society;
Robert B. Yegge, director, Program of Judicial Administration, and adjunct associate professor of
low, University of Denver College of Law.
* Director of research of the American Bar Foundation; Professor of Law, University of Chicago,
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We were not philosophers at La Garita, and, to a large extent,
we agreed on a rough working definition of the "justice" that we
were exploring. Justice, in the sense that we were talking about it
-lawyer's justice, if you will-is the determination of the controversies that arise in society between man and man, or between the
individual and the state, in a way that takes due and proper account both of the demands of general legal principle and of the
merits of particular concrete cases.
Of course, there is more to justice than this. Law is not a closed
system; it lives and progresses and gains its great momentum only
when the passion for justice is shared by all members of society.
We have long been aware in Anglo-American societies that it is
not enough that justice be done. It must also be seen to be done.
Persons who come into touch with the functioning of legal institutions, as jurymen, witnesses or parties, must be persuaded of law's
rightness, must be brought to say: "Yes, that was right; that was
fair."
II.

THE LAW EXPLOSION

At La Garita, we were agreed around our conference table
that the problems of judicial administration in the twentieth century are made incomparably more difficult by the fact that we are
in the midst of what I have recently been calling the "law explosion." We have heard a great deal lately about the population explosion. Now we have the law explosion, the proliferation of controversies and legal problems of range and number quite beyond
anything with which an earlier legal order has ever had to deal.
To a limited extent, this law explosion is a function of the population explosion: twice as many people, therefore twice as many lawsuits, twice as many offenses, twice as many delinquencies. But
that is not the whole story. If it were, all that we would have to do
is to increase the number of our judges by a factor equal to the increase of population that has occurred during the last 50 years, and
all our problems would be solved. We know, however, that this is
not true.
Contributing to the law explosion are all the tasks created for
law administration by the vast and almost incomprehensible technological developments of this century. To take but one example,
we have the development of the automobile and of mass transportation by automobile, and, in consequence, the staggering volume
of automobile accident cases which our courts must hear and decide. Further, and particularly in the years since the end of World
War II, great movements of population have taken place in the
United States, from the south to the north and from farms and
small towns to the great cities. These migrations have created terribly difficult problems of adjustment to the conditions of metropolitan life, and the caseload of law administration in every great
city increases as newcomers fail to withstand the strains of metropolis. In addition to all this, law in our time has had to take on an
increasing role as a force for social order and stability, because of
the waning influence of the family and of other non-legal controls
on social behavior. Contemporary statistics on divorce, family dis-
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ruption, juvenile delinquency and mental illness testify to the everincreasing burdens that must be carried by our legal institutions.
Whether we like it or not-I don't like it either, but we have
to acknowledge it-the administration of justice is no longer a
handcraft like custom tailoring or cabinet making. Law has become a mass production operation, perhaps the biggest assembly
line of them all. This, in large part, is the challenge to contemporary judicial administration.
We are all uncomfortably aware of the fantastic congestion of
our court dockets in matters of civil litigation. In criminal matters,
too, and in matters of juenvile delinquency and commitment for
mental illness, the case-load has become so heavy that adjudications have to be ground out, so many cases to the hour, as if the
lives of the people concerned were mere blanks for processing. In
some areas of law administration, quantitative pressures have
caused the legal order to give up by default. In many parts of the
United States, arbitration has replaced court litigation as the principal means for the resolution of important commercial controversies, and centuries of common law experience in the just decision of contract disputes are about to go by the board. In negligence situations, the state of affairs is even more discouraging. For
most of our citizens, the "living law" of automobile accident compensation is not the law of courts and legislatures but the largely
unregulated practice of insurance company claim adjustment.
These adjustments and compromises may be fair and workable;
my point is that they are not, in any realistic sense, within the rule
of law.
Today's pressures on the legal order, and particularly on judicial administration are not exclusively quantitative pressures, however. This is a time of vast social change, a time in which we encounter not only massive increases in population but also new social
conditions, new ideas of social justice, new and unsettling demands
for equality of opportunity and status. In the courts and in the legislatures, effective spokesmen are expressing drastically changed
social attitudes and proposing new social norms and social institutions. "Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still." If law
stands still, it loses its power as a force for social stability.
One of the great issues that confronts any group like our little
ad hoc jury at La Garita-or, for that matter, the bar of a great
state-is this: what should law's relation be to the wider society
that it seeks to order and stabilize? The great and important truth
here is that law's relation to societal attitudes is a reciprocal relation, not a one-way street. In its content, law reflects the influence
of societal attitudes and community morality, but law is also an
article of our faith and a major influence on public ideas of morality.
Law must be responsive to social change, in the sense that law's
prescribed norms of behavior must not be out of touch with prevailing societal norms. But it is equally important that law itself
be seen in its aspect as an agency of social change, an instrument
of social progress. To make my point that law itself is one of the
great formative influences on community morality, let me repeat
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a favorite quotation of mine, one that originated as a rebuke to me
from a great legal historian under whom I once had the honor to
study. Sir William Holdsworth once dressed me down sharply for
something I had said about the beneficent influence of the English
character on the growth of the common law. Said Holdsworthand in anger:
It is nonsense for any one to talk about the influence of
the English character on the common law if he does not
take at least equal account of the influence that the common law has had on the formation of the English character.
In planning any program for research in judicial administration, room must be found for such great issues as these: How can
law and legal institutions be kept in touch with contemporary
social needs and aspirations? What means are at hand to keep law's
prescriptions reasonably responsive to prevailing social norms?
How can law be made most effective as a force for social stability,
progress, and public enlightenment? Questions like these will never
find an answer if the legal profession continues to maintain its accustomed self-segregation from the other disciplines that study the
problems of society. Lawyers alone cannot do the job of comprehensive law reform any more than medicine could have achieved
it's near miracles without the advancement of the life sciences or
industrial technology could have worked its wonders without drawing on developments in the physical sciences.
Law, in a sense, has been a technology in search of a "pure
science" partner. Now, almost unbeknownst to us lawyers, the
newer sciences of society have grown into maturity-sociology,
social psychology, political science, anthropology, economics, even
the traditional discipline of history in certain of its newer orientations. Social science insights and methods are there to be drawn
on for the improvement of legal institutions. How are we lawyers
to go about it? We must, I suggest, recognize that even legal competence is not infinite and unlimited, and acknowledge our urgent
need for partnership in law improvement. In terms of the classic
request, men of law must ask the behavioral scientists to come over
into Macedonia and help us. Perhaps the greatest task that legal
scholars, judges and practicing lawyers have in the years ahead is
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to devise patterns of colleagueship-I steal the word from Donald
Young-within which the subtle and disciplined knowledge and
techniques of the social sciences can be drawn on for the advancement of legal understanding and the improvement of legal institutions.
III.

THE BENEFITS OF PARTNERSHIP

In a law-social science partnership, what benefits would be
derived by each of the partners? We on the law side can furnish
the behavioral scientists with a kind of equivalent of laboratory
conditions and with data worthy of serious investigation. Law is
not the only force of social control, but it is certainly one of the
greatest influences on social behavior, and social norms are at best
imperfectly understood if studied in total separation from the going
legal order. Law's gain from the partnership will be even greater.
Legal scholarship and practical law administration have urgent
need of the new and developing insights of the behavioral sciences
concerning the regularities of human behavior and the structure
of social institutions. We need to know far more than we know today concerning the dynamics that underlie the formation of social
attitudes and the gap that seems to exist in any society between
that society's professed ideals and its day-to-day practices.
We have much to learn, too, from social science research methodology. Such interdisciplinary inquiries as we have had so farthe Chicago jury studies, the Columbia Project for Effective Justice, and a few more-have demonstrated the value for law of certain sophisticated and tried methods of social science research and
data evaluation. These methods, if put to the use of the legal order,
can give us means by which we can find out-as legislators, judges,
practicing lawyers and law professors often must find out-what
is really going on in the world outside the law library, why social
behavior is what it is, and how we must go about fashioning a legal
imperative that can become effective law in action.
This colleagueship in legal research is not something to be
achieved by having lawyers call in the behavioral scientists from
time to time for one-shot ad hoc collaboration, as a tax practitioner
might call in an accountant to help him in a particularly troublesome case. The partnership must be full and continuing, even with
respect to the identification of problems for investigation. Above
all, perhaps, the law partner must work closely with the social
science partner at the crucial stage of planning the structure of the
basic research design, a task which-believe it or not-is fully as
difficult as, perhaps even a little harder than, writing the brief in
a close and complex case for the toughest of appellate courts. If
such a partnership in research can ever be worked out, how marvelous the results might be for legal scholarship, for the behavioral
sciences and for the administration of justice!
IV.

AREA FOR STUDY

May I try to suggest a few of the studies which might be undertaken here in Denver, or at some other institution of equal re-
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sources, with the collaboration of the social scientists? Consider, as
a general heading, studies of the relation of formal legal norms to
the social norms by which members of our society live. How little
we know of the "living law" of the social order! We have our lawyers' guesses, but we are learning these days that much of our lawyer folklore is quite unrooted in social reality. For example, to what
extent do our positive law norms on racial discrimination correspond to, or differ from, the actual practice of society in matters of
race relations? In my own field of contracts, to what extent does
the formal law of contracts correspond to the prevailing norms of
the business community in the negotiation and observance of contract provisions? In criminal law administration, to what extent do
established codes of criminal procedure describe what is actually
done in practice by policemen, minor magistrates, and those in
charge of penal institutions?
At every point in law administration, need exists for what
might be described as "efficacy studies." How is a legislative reform working in fact? To what extent have the hopes and expectations of the statute's sponsors been realized in action? Law reformers, I suggest, are far too ready to say "mission accomplished" as
soon as a reform proposal passes the legislature and finds its way
into the statute books. A long and painstaking second look, a few
years later, may reveal that the mission has not been accomplished
at all and, even beyond that, may suggest clues as to what might
be done to make the statute more effective as a force of social control and social persuasion. Consider, for example, the procedures
for judicial selection developed by the American Judicature Society
and long supported by the American Bar Association. Is it now
time for an "efficacy study" of the effect of these plans? Might we
not, with the aid of the social scientists, take that long second look
and try to appraise the extent to which the objectives of these selection plans have really been achieved in terms of better judges?
This would be a hard study, of course, but it is not one beyond the
reach of the most imaginative of contemporary social science research methods.
Let me suggest another category of investigation, this one related to what I said in my opening remarks about the necessity
that justice not only be done but also be seen to be done. Most of
the members of our society come into touch with the legal order
only a few times in their lives, perhaps as jurors or as small claims
litigants or as traffic violators. How do these people, these occasional subjects of the legal order, feel about their treatment by the
law and its ministers? The sense of justice, we have agreed, has its
most important location in the hearts of all the people, not merely
in the impressions acquired by those who come to court often and
usually in the company of lawyers. I was delighted to see that the
Program in Judicial Administration of this university already includes a study of the functioning of the Denver small claims court.
A study like this could serve as an ideal proving ground for examination, in collaboration with qualified social scientists, of the ways
in which ordinary citizens form their impressions of the working
of the legal order.
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I think I have time for one more example, this one of a rather
different research character. The Program in Judicial Administration at Denver might, my colleagues and I believe, address its attention to the causes of overcrowded dockets in the appellate courts.
Is it true, as customarily asserted, that far too many cases are being
appealed? If so, why are these useless appeals being taken? We
discussed this problems at La Garita under the shorthand designation, "the Cardozo hypothesis." The reference is to a famous passage in one of Cardozo's books in which the great judge said that
four-fifths of the cases that reached the Court of Appeals of New
York should never have come there but should have been disposed
of with finality in the trial court. The Denver judicial administration program might usefully undertake a carefully designed and
sharply focused study of, say, the workload of the Supreme Court
of Colorado over a span of two or three years, appraise the validity
of the Cardozo hypothesis as applied to appellate litigation in Colorado, and offer explanations of the situation and possible ways and
means of correction. Manifestly, the problem is one of substantial
importance in the drive to reduce congestion in the courts.
The foregoing are only examples of many subjects of inquiry
that might have been given. I have, by the way, been reporting
these possible research areas from a tentative list prepared at the
end of the second day of our La Garita conference.
V.

OFF TO THE RIGHT START

All of us-judges, social scientists and law professors-feel
profoundly that the enterprise of the College of Law is to be warmly commended, not only for the imagination, sensitivity and modesty with which the enterprise has been devised but also because
the University of Denver is getting off to the right start by bringing the behavioral scientists into the picture at the very beginning
of its program planning.
Here, within the city of Denver and the state of Colorado, research scholars have access to legal institutions that can be studied
on the spot and in depth, legal institutions that can be reached and
examined, not simply looked at from afar. We profoundly hope that
Dean Hurst and Professor Yegge and their colleagues of the College
of Law will continue to enjoy support from the judiciary of Colorado-a support which is already evident in the presence of two
judges among the 12 jurymen assembled on this platform. We hope,
too, that the College of Law will have the continuing benefit of
suggestions, criticisms and support from the practicing bar of the
city and the state. People who don't like lawyers are fond of saying
-and it is painfully close to true-that they cannot think of any
profound improvement in the administration of justice that was
ever brought about primarily at the initiative of lawyers. "Law
improvement," so the jibe goes, "is too important to be left to the
lawyers." All of us on this panel hope profoundly that the old
charge will be disproved by research activities, such as those proposed here for the College of Law, that will be carried on by our
law schools, our law-related research institutions and our bar associations during the years ahead.
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